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PROJECT
CONGRESS OPENS A PANDORA'S BOX-THE
RESTITUTION PROVISIONS OF THE VICTIM
AND WITNESS PROTECTION ACT OF 1982
INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, the plight of the victim, the "forgotten
person,"' has come to the forefront of the public's consciousness. 2
Victim and witness assistance programs have been established
throughout the country, and a majority of states has enacted legisla-
tion designed to protect victims and witnesses. 3 The federal criminal
justice system, however, has heretofore been "offender-oriented," 4
unresponsive and insensitive to the needs of victims and witnesses.-
Congress enacted the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982
(VWPA or Act)6 to improve the treatment of victims and witnesses in
the federal criminal system. 7 The Act is the federal government's first
attempt to respond to these concerns.
1. S. Rep. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Gong.
& Ad. News 2515, 2516 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]; Division of Continuing
Education and Training, Federal Judicial Center, Video Teleconference on the
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, March 15, 1983, Audio Tapes, side 1 of 5
(statement of L. Schwartz, Benjamin Franklin Prof. of Law, Univ. of Pa.) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Teleconference Tapes]. Traditionally, the victim has been deemed a
"mere witness" without any input into the disposition of cases or charges levied
against the defendant. Senate Report, supra, at 11 (testimony of Hon. Edward J.
Northrop, Senior Judge, D. Md.), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
2517. It has been stated that the victim "has no right of allocution and is often
overlooked in the process of plea negotiation." Id. The VWPA recognizes the integral
role of the victim in the criminal justice system. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512 note (1982)
(Federal Guidelines for Treatment of Crime Victims and Witnesses in the Criminal
Justice System). In testimony before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law, Judge
Edward S. Northrop stated that "[o]ur position is that we should not prosecute, try,
and sentence any defendant without at least listening to the victim's offense-related
needs." Senate Report, supra, at 11, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 2517.
2. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Victim and Witness Assist-
ance: New State Laws and the System's Response 1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as New
State Laws].
3. Id. at 1; see statutes cited infra note 194.
4. New State Laws, supra note 2, at 1.
5. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2516; New State Laws, supra note 2, at 1. The VWPA is landmark legisla-
tion recognizing and focusing upon the needs of victims. Teleconference Tapes, supra
note 1, side 3 of 5 (statement of E. DiToro, Probation Officer, E.D.N.Y.).
6. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(2)).
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512 note (1982) (Federal Guidelines for Treatment of Crime
Victims and Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System).
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This Project focuses on the restitution provisions of the VWPA
which enable judges to order restitution in addition to other types of
punishment9 rather than solely as a condition of probation.' 0 The Act
favors the ordering of restitution;" judges must order restitution in
each case unless they state reasons for not so doing.12
The restitution provisions are intended to aid crime victims by
requiring convicted defendants to compensate their victims to the
greatest extent possible,' 3 thus achieving the "ultimate justice.' 4 Con-
gress, however, has limited the imposition of restitution to only those
circumstances when restitution will "not unduly complicate or pro-
long the sentencing process," 15 or infringe upon the defendant's consti-
tutional rights. 16
8. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580 (1982). In addition to the restitution provisions, the
Act has three major features. First, the obstruction of justice provisions of title 18 are
amended to prohibit the harassment and intimidation of victims and witnesses. 18
U.S.C. §§ 1512-1515 (1982). Second, Rule 32(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure is amended to require that a Victim Impact Statement be prepared as part
of the pre-sentence process so that the effect of the offender's crime upon the victim
may be assessed. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(2). Finally, the VWPA adds as a condition of
bail in non-capital offenses that the accused not commit an offense under the title 18
obstruction of justice provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1982).
9. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 30, 32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 2536, 2538; Implementation of the Restitution Provisions of the Victim
and Witness Protection Act of 1982 at 4 (August 29, 1983) (memorandum from D.
Lowell Jensen, Associate Attorney General) [hereinafter cited as Justice Dep't Guide-
lines]; see 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982).
10. Prior to the enactment of the VWPA federal judges could impose restitution
only as a condition of probation. Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 7; see 18
U.S.C. § 3651 (1982) (restitution as condition of probation); Senate Report, supra
note 1, at 30 (VWPA restitution provisions permit court to order restitution indepen-
dent of probation), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong & Ad. News at 2536.
11. See Note, Restitution in the Criminal Process: Procedures for Fixing the
Offender's Liability, 93 Yale L.J. 505, 509 & n.18 (1984).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(2) (1982) (when a judge orders partial or no restitution
he must state his reasons for so doing on the record); Brief for United States at 2,
United States v. Welden, appeal docketed, No. 83-7-444 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 1983);
Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 4.
13. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2536; Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 17, 20.
14. See 128 Cong. Rec. H8209 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Fish);
id. at H8207 (remarks of Rep. McCollum); Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side
1 of 5 (statement of L. Schwartz, Benjamin Franklin Prof. of Law, Univ. of Pa.).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(d) (1982). This provision was included "to prevent senten-
cing hearings from becoming prolonged and complicated trials on the question of
damages." Senate Report, supra note 1, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 2537; see Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 1 of 5 (statement of
L. Schwartz, Benjamin Franklin Prof. of Law, Univ. of Pa.) (no restitution is to be
ordered if the sentencing process will be unduly complicated and prolonged). Con-
gress considered how restitution would affect the sentencing process when the Crimi-
nal Code Reform Act of 1981 was drafted. The bill's legislative history stated that a
court should not consider imposing restitution when such consideration would un-
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The first part of this Project analyzes the Act's key terms as well as
the problems arising from the failure of the Act to address various
issues. Part II examines the procedural considerations that result from
the introduction of restitution as a component of sentencing, including
the need for a jury and plea bargaining. The third part questions the
effectiveness of restitution as a means to meet the VWPA goal of
compensating victims. The congressional limitations imposed upon
restitution affect the scope of the Act, the procedures used to imple-
ment the Act, and the effectiveness of restitution in fully compensat-
ing victims.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE VWPA
Many of the Act's terms relating to restitution are not defined. As a
result, trial judges have not been provided with guidance to effectuate
the goals of the Act. Several problems that result from the Act's failure
to define adequately and to address various issues can be highlighted
by the following hypothetical crime. 17 Two armed men enter a feder-
ally-insured bank and order the tellers to empty the cash drawers and
deliver the contents to them. The tellers comply with the demand and
give the offenders $20,000. A teller is then assaulted by one of the
perpetrators with the butt of a pistol. The other employees' and
customers' jewelry and money are stolen. The armed men flee the
bank in a stolen automobile. Two weeks after the first bank robbery,
the perpetrators rob a second bank.
The culprits are later apprehended and charged with both bank
robberies and the assault upon the teller of the first bank. The defend-
ants are convicted for the first bank robbery and the assault. The first
bank is awarded $5000 in restitution.
A. The Definition of "Offense":
The Basis of Restitution
The VWPA provides that the court "when sentencing a defendant
convicted of an offense ... may order ... that the defendant make
duly complicate or prolong the sentencing process. S. Rep. No. 307, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 993, 1000 [hereinafter cited as 1981 Senate Report]. The Justice Department
recommends that "[t]he simplest, most unencumbered method of handling [the]
sentencing hearing" be utilized. Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 4. It has
warned that the Department will "resist attempts to expand sentencing into a full-
blown hearing separate from the allocution process." Id.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 note (1982) (Federal Guidelines for Treatment of Crime
Victims and Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System).
17. The hypothetical is largely derived from the hypothetical crime presented at
the Teleconference on the VWPA. See Division of Continuing Education and Train-
ing, Federal Judicial Center, Materials to Accompany "Video Teleconference on the
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982," March 15, 1983, at 16-21 [hereinafter
cited as Materials to Accompany Teleconference].
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restitution to any victim of the offense." ' The definition of "offense"
necessarily determines the overall victimization-the compensable
harm suffered by those considered to be victims. 19 The statute does not
define "offense," and there are a number of possible interpretations.2 0
Application of each of these possible interpretations of "offense" in the
context of the hypothetical crime may result in dramatically different
restitution awards. If restitution is limited to the title 18 offenses of
which the defendants are convicted2 1 only the first bank and the
assaulted bank teller would be eligible to receive restitution.2 2 Alter-
natively, if restitution is based on the criminal transaction charged, 23
the sentencing judge could also order restitution to the second bank
even though the defendants were not convicted of that robbery.24 An
even broader view might entitle the owner of the stolen automobile
and the customers of the first bank to recover. 2
1. The Restrictive Interpretation
The restrictive interpretation of "offense" is similar to the offense
limitation of the Federal Probation Act.26 The Probation Act provides
that "among the conditions [of probation] the defendant. . .[m]ay be
required to make restitution . . . to aggrieved parties fof . .. loss
caused by the offense for which conviction was had."'27 The VWPA
does not contain this limiting language. Despite the absence of such
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982).
19. See Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 1 of 5 (statement of L. Sch-
wartz, Benjamin Franklin Prof. of Law, Univ. of Pa.).
20. See Overview and Analysis of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982:
Responsibilities of Federal Defenders 2-3 (March 15, 1983 Teleconference) (memo-
randum of Fred Warren Bennett, Federal Public Defender, D. Md.) (available in
files of Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Bennett]; Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982 6 (June 28, 1983) (memorandum from Frank X. Altimari,
United States District Court Judge to Judges of the Eastern District of New York)
(available in files of Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Altimari].
21. Bennett, supra note 20, at 2. See infra note 27.
22. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
23. See Bennett, supra note 20, at 2; Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 7,
17. An order of restitution based on the criminal transaction charged could extend
beyond the conviction, and encompass harm resulting from crimes which were
charged but for which no conviction was obtained.
24. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982).
27. Id. (emphasis added). Courts have construed the language of the Probation
Act literally. See, e.g., United States v. Buechler, 557 F.2d 1002, 1007 (3d Cir.
1977); United States v. Taylor, 305 F.2d 183, 187 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
894 (1962); United States v. Follette, 32 F. Supp. 953, 955 (E.D. Pa. 1940). For
judicially-created exceptions to the Probation Act limitation see infra notes 39-42 and
accompanying text.
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language in comparable state restitution statutes, a number of state
courts have adopted the same restrictive interpretation. 28
This interpretation ensures that restitution is directly related to the
criminal act. 29 Further, the defendant may not have had an opportu-
nity to have adjudicated his guilt or innocence for the additional
offenses encompassed in a broadly-defined restitution order.30 Finally,
the rehabilitative effects of restitution may be diminished if the resti-
tution order encompasses conduct that caused harm that is not obvi-
ous or apparent to the offender in relation to the crime for which he
was charged and convicted. 31 For example, the offenders in the hypo-
thetical crime may resent a requirement that restitution be made to
the owner of the stolen automobile when they were neither charged
with nor convicted of that offense. Restitution aids in the rehabilita-
tion of offenders32 by strengthening their sense of responsibility 33 and
28. See, e.g., People v. Becker, 349 Mich. 476, 483-84, 84 N.W.2d 833, 837
(1957); People v. Lofton, 78 Misc. 2d 202, 205, 356 N.Y.S.2d 791, 793 (Crim. Ct.
1974); People v. Funk, 117 Misc. 778, 779-80, 193 N.Y.S. 302, 303 (Erie County Ct.
1921); State v. Barnett, 110 Vt. 221, 227, 231-32, 3 A.2d 521, 524, 525 (1939); Note,
Use of Restitution in the Criminal Process: People v. Miller, 16 UCLA L. Rev. 456,
460-61 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Use of Restitution]. A number of state legislatures
have explicitly adopted the conviction-only limitation in state restitution statutes.
See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.55.100(a)(2) (1980); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 947.181 (Supp.
1982); Va. Stat. Ann. § 19.2-305.1 (1983).
29. See Use of Restitution, supra note 28, at 460; cf. People v. Dominguez, 256
Cal. App. 2d 623, 627, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (1967) (court struck down sentence
imposing restitution for acts that were not related to crime for which defendant was
convicted); People v. Mahle, 57 Ill. 2d 279, 284, 312 N.E.2d 267, 271 (1974)
(restitution may not extend to matters "unrelated to charges before court").
30. See Harand, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the
Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 52, 81 (1982) (restitution may
encompass offenses never adjudicated or charged) [hereinafter cited as Harland I]. In
United States v. Buechler, 557 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir. 1977), the district court imposed
restitution as a condition. Id. at 1003. The amount ordered exceeded the amount of
loss caused by the specific acts for which the defendant was convicted. The defendant
argued that such restitution was a violation of due process because it required the
payment of restitution based upon facts that the defendant had no opportunity to
contest. The Court of Appeals did not reach the consitutional issue; rather, it relied
on the limiting language of the Probation Act to strike the condition. Id. at 1003,
1007-08.
31. State v. Stalheim, 275 Or. 683, 688, 552 P.2d 829, 832 (1976). But see People
v. Miller, 256 Cal. App. 2d 348, 356, 64 Cal. Rptr. 20, 25 (1967) (rehabilitation
requires that defendant's probation be conditioned on realities of situation without
all technical limitations in determining scope of the offense for which defendant was
convicted). For a complete discussion of People v. Miller see Use of Restitution, supra
note 28.
32. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2538; Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 2 of 5 (statement of D.
Chamlee, Deputy Chief, Probation Division, Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts). Restitution serves two purposes-it restores the victim to his prior state of
well-being and aids in the rehabilitation of the offender. Laster, Criminal Restitu-
tion: A Survey of its Past History and an Analysis of its Present Usefulness, 5 U. Rich.
L. Rev. 71, 80 (1970).
33. United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907, 912 (D. Md. 1981); Telecon-
ference Tapes, supra note 1, side 2 of 5 (statement of D. Chamlee, Deputy Chief,
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leading them to appreciate the consequences of their actions. 34 These
rehabilitative goals are not furthered if the offenders are punished for
a crime of which they have not been found guilty.
The restrictive approach, however, presents practical difficulties
that could limit victim compensation. 35 In the hypothetical crime, for
example, a decision by the United States District Attorney to prosecute
only the first bank robbery36 would effectively eliminate the restitu-
tion rights of the assaulted teller and the second bank.37 The restrictive
approach may also affect a prosecutor's willingness to negotiate a plea
arrangement. 38 One court analyzing the restrictive approach of the
Federal Probation Act has noted that "[i]f a defendant [cannot] con-
sent to make restitution for the actual loss caused by his or her
conduct" that did not result in conviction, the prosecutor has less
reason to dismiss counts pursuant to plea bargaining in order to limit a
defendant's potential period of incarceration. 3 This may lead to fur-
ther congestion of the already crowded court system.
Two judicially-created exceptions to the restrictive approach have
been adopted in cases decided under the Federal Probation Act to
respond to some of these problems. The first exception applies when
there is a plea-bargaining arrangement in which the defendant has
agreed to make restitution for conduct other than that for which the
Probation Division, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts). Restitution is a penal
sanction imposed against the offender to require him to recognize his obligation to
the victim of the offense. 1981 Senate Report, supra note 15, at 1001.
34. State v. Stalheim, 275 Or. 683, 688-89, 552 P.2d 829, 832 (1976); Huggett v.
State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 798, 266 N.W.2d 403, 407 (1978); Schafer, Restitution to
Victims of Crime-An Old Correctional Aim Modernized, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 243, 250
(1965); see United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907, 912 (D. Md. 1981); see
also Durst v. United States, 434 U.S. 542, 549, 553-54 (1978) (restitution may result
in increased respect for the law).
35. See United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907, 912 (D. Md. 1981)
(restrictive approach diminishes likelihood of plea bargaining and frustrates rehabili-
tative goals); People v. Mahle, 57 Ill. 2d 279, 284, 312 N.E.2d 267, 271 (1974)
(restitution may not extend to matters unrelated to the charges before the court);
State v. Cox, 35 Or. App. 169, 171-72, 581 P.2d 104, 105-06 (1978) (restrictive
approach eliminates restitution rights of victims if full loss not originally reported-
conviction will be based on lesser degree of crime).
36. See State v. Scherr, 9 Wis. 2d 418, 423, 101 N.W.2d 77, 80 (1960) ("[It [is] a
common practice ... for a prosecutor to charge a defendant with the commission of
only one offense of a series."); Harland I, supra note 30, at 82-83 ("The prolific
activities of many checkpassers . . . are usually underrepresented because of the
typical prosecution practice of charging only one or two counts in exchange for a
negotiated guilty plea.").
37. See Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 8 (only victims named in
indictment are eligible to receive restitution).
38. United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907, 912 (D. Md. 1981).
39. Id. The reasoning of the McLaughlin case is even more appropriate under the
VWPA because the prosecutor acts as the victim's advocate. See infra note 44.
[Vol. 52
1984] RESTITUTION UNDER THE VWPA 513
conviction was had. 40 In this instance, the defendant simply agrees to
pay restitution for losses. The second exception is when the defendant
admits to or does not contest the amount of harm. Such exceptions
are appropriate because the reasons supporting the conviction-only
limitation do not apply if a defendant has admitted his liability or has
agreed to make restitution. 42 When a defendant admits liability, the
factual question of the defendai.t's responsibility for the loss is moot.
In addition, public policy dictates that a defendant willing to make
restitution should be permitted to do so. 43 These exceptions should
apply with equal force to the VWPA. Prosecutors, who serve as victim
40. Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 3 of 5 (statement of Judge J. Miller,
Jr., D. Md.); see, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192, 194 (9th Cir. 1982)
(defendant consented, pursuant to plea agreement, to pay restitutionary amount
which was not to be limited to the amount set forth in the counts); United States v.
McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907, 912 (D. Md. 1981) (defendant agreed to make
restitution for losses resulting from five counts of embezzlement charged even though
defendant was convicted of only one of these counts).
41. See United States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052, 1054 (7th Cir. 1982) (restitution
upheld even though amount ordered was in excess of loss sustained from the acts for
which defendant had pleaded guilty because amount had been established and
admitted to by defendant); United States v. Landay, 513 F.2d 306, 308 (5th Cir.
1975) (defendant "freely and voluntarily admitted the exact amount the [bank]
claimed he owed"). Several state restitution statutes have also adopted this exception.
See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 910.1(3) (West Supp. 1983-1984) (restitution may
include losses which defendant admits to or does not contest); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-
37-3(1) (Supp. 1983) (same); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-17-1(A)(3), (4) (1981) (same); Or.
Rev. Stat. § 136.103(1) (1981) (same); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23A-28-2(3) (1979
& Supp. 1982) (same).
42. One factor supporting the restrictive approach is that it enhances the rehabil-
itative effect of restitution. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. The
rehabilitation of the offender also requires, however, that restitution be made when
the offender admits to causing the harm or when he has consented to make restitu-
tion. See United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907, 912 (D. Md. 1981)
(rehabilitative goal of restitution would be frustrated if defendant, as condition of
probation, could admit guilt, consent to restitution, and later challenge the amount
of restitution); People v. Miller, 256 Cal. App. 2d 348, 356, 64 Cal. Rptr. 20, 25
(1967) (rehabilitation requires that the conditions of probation be imposed without
many technical limitations). In addition, when a defendant admits to causing the
harm or consents to restitution there is little likelihood that the harm is not obvious or
apparent to him. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
43. Permitting a defendant who has consented to restitution to escape a restitu-
tion order simply because the harm resulted from acts other than those for which the
defendant was convicted is intolerable from a public policy viewpoint. United States
v. McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907, 912 (D. Md. 1981); see People v. Gallagher, 55
Mich. App. 613, 619, 223 N.W.2d 92, 95 (1974) (court, in authorizing restitution in
amount greater than that resulting from acts for which defendant was convicted,
stated that "[c]rime should not be profitable"). The goals of the VWPA also favor
permitting the court to order restitution when the defendant admits to causing the
harm or agrees to make restitution. Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 3 of 5
(statement of Judge J. Miller, Jr., D. Md.).
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advocates under the Act,44 should be able to plea bargain or drop
charges while preserving the restitutionary rights of all victims of such
charges.
2. The Broad Interpretations
The absence of the restrictive statutory language of the Federal
Probation Act 45 in the VWPA suggests that Congress intended a broad
offense limitation based on the "criminal transaction" charged. 4 Sev-
44. The Act imposes upon the prosecutor "[t]he burden of demonstrating the
amount of the loss sustained by a victim." 18 U.S.C. § 3580(d) (1982), see Justice
Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3. The extent to which a prosecutor should pursue
a victim's claim, however, is unsettled. One commentator has suggested that "the
prosecutor should be a vigorous advocate for the victim at the time of sentencing to
insure [that] the court is fully cognizant of the extent of injury suffered by the
victim." Hearings on Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 before the Sub-
comm. on Aging of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1983) (statement of Jay B. Stephens, Deputy Associate Attorney General):
see Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side I of 5 (statement of Judge G. B. Tjoflat.
11th Cir.) (prosecutor to represent vigorously victim's interest). The Justice Depart-
ment believes, however, that while "federal prosecutors should advocate fully the
rights of victims on the issue of restitution," Office of the Attorney General, Guide-
lines for Victim and Witness Assistance, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,774, 33,777 (1983), the role
of victim advocate is limited by both the other responsibilities of the prosecutor and
the restriction of not unduly prolonging or complicating the sentencing process.
Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3. The Justice Department foresees little
change in the role of the prosecutor, as he will vigorously pursue restitution only
when all other prosecutorial functions can be satisfied. See id. (citing Office of the
Attorney General, Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance, 48 Fed. Reg.
33,774, 33,777 (1983)). At least one state has adopted a similar approach. See Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1321 (1983) ("restitution to be applied only when other
purposes of sentencing can be appropriately served"). Under this view, the concept of
victim advocacy is of limited utility.
45. See supra text accompanying note 27.
46. Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 7-8 ("The Act changes [the Proba-
tion Act] restriction to allow victims named in a restitution order to receive the
amount of compensation necessary to return them to as whole a position as possible.
The determination of this amount is [now] entirely within the sentencing judge's
discretion."); see Senate Report, supra note 1, at 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 2536; Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 17 ("Only
victims of the criminal transaction for which the defendant was convicted may
receive restitution."); Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 1 of 5 (statement of L.
Schwartz, Benjamin Franklin Professor of Law, Univ. of Pa.) (supporting broad
interpretation of term "offense" to account for aggregate victimization). But see
Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama at 6, In re United States, No. 83-7-583 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 1983)
(mandamus sought from order issued in United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516
(N.D. Ala. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-7-444 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 1983)) (new
restitution provisions simply expand application of restitution so that it is available in
all criminal actions) [hereinafter cited as Petitition for Writ of Mandamus]; Telecon-
ference Tapes, supra note 1, side 2 of 5 (statement of D. Chamlee, Deputy Chief,
Probation Division, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts) (restitution to be
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eral state courts have adopted the even broader view that the restitu-
tion order may encompass related crimes that have not been
charged.47 Including the harm caused by conduct for which there was
no conviction or charge with that caused by the conduct charged
would increase the aggregate victimization and, therefore, the restitu-
tion rights of victims. 48 Such a result would advance the VWPA's
compensatory goal. The rule of lenity, which requires that "penal
statutes ... be strictly construed against the government or parties
seeking to exact statutory penalties and in favor of persons on whom
such penalties are sought to be imposed, '49 however, supports the
restrictive interpretation because it results in a lower restitutionary
obligation for the defendant.
Moreover, although the broad interpretations of the offense limita-
tion best serve the compensatory goal of the VWPA, these views may
limited to offense for which the conviction was obtained). The Criminal Code
Revision Act of 1980, H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), a proposed but
unenacted bill, served as a model for the VWPA. See 128 Cong. Rec. H8202 (daily
ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (statement of Rep. Rodino). The bill provided that restitution
would be imposed only with respect to damages established by conviction. It further
prohibited restitution for damages caused by conduct in charges that were dismissed.
H.R. Rep. No. 1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 457 (1980) [hereinafter cited as House
Report].
47. See, e.g., People v. Miller, 256 Cal. App. 2d 348, 356, 64 Cal. Rptr. 20, 23
(1967) (as condition of probation, defendant was required to make restitution not
only to victim of one count of grand theft for which he was convicted but also to
other customers of defendant); People v. Richards, 17 Cal. 3d 614, 619-20, 552 P.2d
97, 100, 131 Cal. Rptr. 537, 540 (1976) (court specifically rejected offense limitation
of Probation Act and held that restitution would be allowed for losses in excess of
those resulting from acts for which the defendant was convicted); People v. Gal-
lagher, 55 Mich. App. 613, 617-19, 223 N.W.2d 92, 95 (1974) (restitution ordered for
convicted offense and for another offense allegedly committed by defendant); People
v. Nawrocki, 8 Mich. App. 225, 227, 154 N.W.2d 45, 46 (1967) (same).
48. Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 1 of 5 (statement of L. Schwartz,
Benjamin Franklin Professor of Law, Univ. of Pa.) (recognition that conviction-only
rule represents only small portion of total victimization that has occurred); id. side 2
of 5 (statement of D. Lowell Jensen, Associate Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of
Justice) (restitutionary rights are greater under the broad view); see United States v.
Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516, 517, 525 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (judge considered restitu-
tionary rights of individuals who were not victims of offense for which conviction
was had-these individuals suffered losses because of conduct related to acts for
which defendants were convicted), appeal docketed, No. 83-7-444 (11th Cir. Aug. 8,
1983), petition for writ of mandamus filed sub nom. In re United States, No. 83-7-
583 (l1th Cir. Oct. 25, 1983).
49. 3 C. Sands, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 59.03, at 6-7
(4th ed. 1974) (citations omitted). This rule is to be utilized to the extent that it is
appropriate in light of the stated goals of the legislation. Id. § 59.06, at 18-19; see
State v. Prevo, 44 Hawaii 665, 668-69, 361 P.2d 1044, 1047 (1961) (rule that penal
statutes are to be strictly construed does not permit court to ignore legislative intent).
The rule is applicable to the VVPA because of the specific provision protecting the
defendant's rights. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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violate the constitutional rights of the defendant 0 and the legislative
goal of not unduly prolonging or complicating the sentencing proc-
ess. 51 An order of restitution based on the entire criminal transaction
charged or on related uncharged crimes could require a defendant to
make restitution for losses based upon facts that were not litigated. 52
The hypothetical crime illustrates this point: A restitution order en-
compassing the entire criminal transaction charged or related un-
charged crimes could require the defendants to make restitution to the
second bank, the customers of the first bank and the owner of the
stolen automobile even though the defendants were not convicted of
these offenses. This possibility raises the serious question whether the
defendants have had an opportunity to contest these facts. If not, their
due process rights have been violated.
Due process requires that the record factually support the restitu-
tion order5 3 and that the defendant be given adequate notice and an
opportunity to contest those facts.5 4 Consequently, in order to support
the restitution order, prosecutors would be required to prove facts
ancillary to those necessary for a conviction. This would impermissi-
bly prolong and complicate the sentencing process. 55 The offense limi-
tation of the VWPA, therefore, should be interpreted as a conviction-
50. Due process safeguards may be particularly necessary when the restitution
order extends beyond the convicted offense or takes the form of general damages.
Harland I, supra note 30, at 103. In People v. Richards, 17 Cal. 3d 614, 552 P.2d 97,
131 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1976), the court stated:
A judge may infer from a jury verdict of guilt ... that a defendant is liable
to the crime victim. But a trial court cannot properly conclude that the
defendant owes money to a third party for other unproved or disproved
crimes or conduct. A party sued civilly has important due process rights,
including appropriate pleadings, discovery, and a right to a trial by jury on
the specific issues of liability and damages. The judge in the criminal trial
should not be permitted to emasculate those rights by simply declaring his
belief that the defendant owes a sum of money.
Id. at 620, 552 P.2d at 101, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
51. See supra note 15.
52. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
53. See Commonwealth v. Fuqua, 267 Pa. Super. 504, 510, 407 A.2d 24, 27
(1979); Cartwright v. State, 605 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Thomp-
son v. State, 557 S.W.2d 521, 525-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
54. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981) (opportunity to be heard); United
States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 677 (1980) (same); Memphis Light, Gas, & Water
Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13, 17 (1978) (same); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80
(1972) (same); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971) (notice and opportunity to be
heard); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (opportunity to be heard);
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969) (Harlan, J. concurring)
(notice); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (opportunity to be heard);
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (same). See infra note 238 and accom-
panying text.
55. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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only offense limitation with the restrictive edge dulled by the plea-
bargaining and no-contest exceptions.
B. Calculating Restitution Awards
1. Types of Losses for Which Restitution is Available
The VWPA enumerates particular types of damages that may be
the subject of a restitution order, such as medical expenses, property
loss and funeral expenses. 56 Congress intended the VWPA to require
"the wrongdoer ... to the degree possible to restore the victim to his
or her prior state of well-being."'5 7 This goal, however, must be bal-
anced against the goal that the sentencing process not become unduly
56. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b) (1982). The Act sets forth the types of damages the court
"may require" the defendant to make restitution for as follows:
(b) The order may require that such defendant-
(1) in the case of an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruc-
tion of property of a victim of the offense-
(A) return the property to the owner of the property or someone
designated by the owner; or
(B) if return of the property under subparagraph (A) is impossible,
impractical, or inadequate, pay an amount equal to the greater of-
(i) the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or
destruction, or
(ii) the value of the property on the date of sentencing, less the
value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of the property
that is returned;
(2) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury to a victim-
(A) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary medical and re-
lated professional services and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and
psychological care, including non-medical care and treatment rendered in
accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of
treatment;
(B) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary physical and occu-
pational therapy and rehabilitation; and
(C) reimburse the victim for income lost by such victim as a result of
such offense;
(3) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury [that] also results
in the death of a-victim, pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary
funeral and related services.
Id.
The enumeration of specific types of damages could mean that Congress intended
to exclude all others. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. According to the
Justice Department, pain and suffering and punitive damages are not covered by the
restitution order. Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 9. This conclusion is
appropriate considering the difficulty of measuring such damages.
57. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2536; see Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 7.
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prolonged or complicated.58 Congress intended to prevent the senten-
cing hearing from becoming a trial on the amount of damages.59
In a criminal action, the judge is usually not prepared to settle
complex issues regarding the amount of damages. The sentencing
judge, in the usual criminal case, has neither
the benefit of pleadings which frame the issues nor the testimony of
witnesses to develop evidence relevant to the loss resulting from the
defendant's wrongdoing. Thus, the trial judge is left in the difficult
if not impossible position of having to assign a value to a loss he
knows little about.6 0
Courts applying the VWPA are precluded from considering dam-
ages that are speculative or difficult to measure such as pain and
suffering, loss of consortium or loss of prospective earningsY1 For
example, in the hypothetical crime, restitution should not be awarded
to a bank customer who, for several months following the incident,
suffers recurring headaches and insomnia. To place a dollar value on
this bank customer's harm would, of necessity, prolong and compli-
cate the sentencing process.6 2 Courts, therefore, should be limited to
consideration of the victim's liquidated and easily measurable dam-
ages, 63 such as the dollar amount stolen from the bank or the medical
expenses incurred by the injured bank teller. It is unclear, however,
whether courts are further restricted to only those damages enumer-
ated in the Act. 64
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 3579(d) (1982). Congress recognized that "'an offense-
particularly one causing bodily injury or death-may have lifelong cost implications
for the victim ... but it also recognize[d] that there may sometimes be a practical
necessity in limiting ... the amount of restitution ordered." Senate Report, supra
note 1, at 31-32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2537-38. Such a
practical necessity may arise when a "prolonged and complicated [trial] on the
question of damages owed [to] the victim" would be required. Id. at 31, reprinted in
1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2537.
59. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2537; see Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 4.
60. State v. Stalheim, 275 Or. 683, 687, 552 P.2d 829, 831 (1976).
61. See supra note 56.
62. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
63. The allowance of the "imposition of unliquidated damages, thus including
such losses as pain and suffering, decreased earning capacity, loss of consortium and
the like, [will force] the trial judge ... to make evaluations of losses usually reserved
to civil juries." State v. Stalheim, 275 Or. 683, 686-87, 552 P.2d 829, 831 (1976). The
Georgia courts have adopted a similar position. See, e.g., Biddy v. State, 138 Ga.
App. 4, 8, 225 S.E.2d 448, 451 (1976); O'Quinn v. State, 121 Ga. App. 231, 232, 173
S.E.2d 409, 411 (1970). The Arizona and New Mexico courts appear more liberal.
See State v. Garner, 115 Ariz. 579, 581, 566 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Ct. App. 1977) (trial
court must use "great caution" if restitution goes beyond "special damages"); Shenah
v. Henderson, 106 Ariz. 399, 401, 476 P.2d 854, 856 (1970) (judge had sufficient
evidence upon which to base restitution); State v. Mottola, 84 N.M. 414, 415-16, 504
P.2d 22, 23-24 (Ct. App. 1972) (judge may assess damages in a criminal matter).
64. See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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The canon of statutory interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, provides that "the mention of one thing implies the exclusion
of another thing."65 Therefore, the enumeration of certain types of
damages in the VWPA should preclude a trial judge from ordering
restitution for damages not enumerated in the Act. The legislative
history of the Act, however, may imply that the enumeration of
specific types of damages merely provides examples of recoverable
losses.66 The Senate Report on the Act states that the "several options
* . . provide the court with some flexibility in determining the kind of
restitution. ,6 7 In the Report, however, it is unclear whether "options"
refers to the enumerated damages or solely to whether the method of
restitution should be in the form of money or services.68 Because the
Senate Report does not indicate a clear legislative intent to include
other types of damages, 69 the statute should be construed to limit the
sentencing judge to awarding restitution for the enumerated items.
2. Necessary Expenses and Mitigation
The Act permits the recovery of certain "necessary" expenses, 70 but
does not indicate who has the burden of proving necessity. 7' One
possibility is that necessity is determined by the victim, with the judge
accepting this determination.7 2 The more appropriate view, however,
is that the burden of proof as to what is necessary falls upon the
prosecutor, with the ultimate decision made by the judge.7 3 This is
consistent with the VWPA provision placing "[tihe burden of demon-
strating the amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the
offense [upon] the attorney for the Government. 7 4
65. E. Crawford, Construction of Statutes § 195, at 334-35 (1940). This canon of
construction is to be utilized only to determine legislative intent, not to defeat such
intent when it is apparent. Id. § 195, at 335-36.
66. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2538. But see 1981 Senate Report, supra note 15, at 1000. The Criminal
Code Reform Act of 1981, S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), a predecessor bill to
the VWPA, specified particular damages and losses which could be the subject of a
restitution order. The enumeration was included in that bill to assure that restitution
be ordered only in instances when a court could easily resolve the issues. Id.
67. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2538.
68. See id.
69. The sentence prior to the quotation from the Senate Report, id., refers to
both the enumerated damages as well as the method of satisfying the restitution
requirement. Id.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(2)(A), (B), (3) (1982). See supra note 56.
71. See Bennett, supra note 20, at 3.
72. Id.
73. See id. (discussing question of proof in relation to medical expenses and
related professional services).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(d) (1982).
1984] 519
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
In addition, it is unclear whether a victim is required to mitigate his
damages. 75 Despite the Act's silence in the area, the rules of mitigation
found in civil litigation should apply with equal force to the restitu-
tion provisions. Alternatively, the punishment and sentencing aspects
of restitution suggest that the law of damages applicable to civil
actions should be irrelevant. The failure to incorporate mitigation
concepts in the VWPA provides a disincentive for victims to minimize
their losses and can result in economic waste.76 In light of these
economic considerations, judges should calculate the amount of the
restitution award in accordance with the civil rules of mitigation.
C. Service Restitution in Lieu of Financial Restitution
The VWPA provides that the defendant may be ordered, "if the
victim ... consents, [to] make restitution in services in lieu of
money. '77 The statute does not require corresponding consent from
the convicted offender.78
A requirement that an offender perform services as part of the
penalty for his crime is not unprecedented. 7 In fact, there has been an
75. Bennett, supra note 20, at 4.
76. The civil law concept of mitigating damages results from the idea that
economic waste should be avoided. D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies
§ 3.7 at 188 (1973). Arguably, the concept of mitigation is incorporated in the
"necessity" requirement. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(4) (1982). Service restitution ordered pursuant to the
VWPA may take the form of personal service restitution or community service
restitution. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 2538 (if victim agrees, restitution may be made in services to a
person or organization designated by the victim). See infra note 87. Restitution and
community service are often juxtaposed in state restitution statutes. See Harland,
Court-Ordered Community Service in Criminal Law: The Continuing Tyranny oJ
Benevolence?, 29 Buffalo L. Rev. 425, 429 & table 1, col. 7, at 432-39 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Harland II]. Personal service restitution requires the offender to
perform services directly for the victim to compensate for losses sustained by the
victim. See Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 1 of 5 (statement of L.
Schwartz, Benjamin Franklin Prof. of Law, Univ. of Pa.) (example of offender
performing gardening service for victim as personal restitution). Community service
restitution is not really restitution at all. Community service, although linked in
theory to restitution by criminal offenders, Harland II, supra, at 429, generally
satisfies a "secondary function by providing an option for those offenders who cannot
afford financial [restitution] or whose crimes did not result in a restitutionable loss to
the victim." Id. The victim is not directly compensated when the service is commu-
nity service; instead the offender performs service to the community at large. See id.
at 428-30 (community service benefits community, not victim); Miss. Code Ann. §
47-7-47(4) (Supp. 1983) (community service considered "restitution. . . to society").
In light of the VWPA requirement for victim consent to any form of service restitu-
tion, 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(4) (1982), the distinction between personal service and
community service is of little consequence.
78. See 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(4) (1982).
79. The thirteenth amendment recognizes the propriety of involuntary servitude
as punishment for crime. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither sldvery nor involun-
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increase in the use of community service restitution for criminal of-
fenders in a probationary context. s0
Three reasons have been advanced to support the use of service
restitution. First, performance of service provides an alternative to
incarceration."' Judges order service to rehabilitate the offender with-
out burdening society with the costs of maintaining the offender in
prison. This rationale, however, is not wholly transferable to the
VWPA, which enables a court to order service restitution in addition
to incarceration. 2 Second, community service restitution as a condi-
tion of probation is a voluntary undertaking on the part of the of-
fender; the offender can either agree to the conditions of probation or
serve his sentence. 3 This alternative, however, is not available under
the VWPA. 4 Finally, the performance of service is seen as a rehabili-
tative experience for the offender. 85 This last reason is the most perti-
nent to the VWPA. The compensatory goal of the Act may be satisfied
while the rehabilitation of the defendant is also promoted. s8
The use of service restitution as an alternative to financial restitu-
tion may discriminate against indigents because service may be the
only viable means to achieve restitution when funds for financial
tary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States ....").
80. See Harland II, supra note 77, at 428-29. The increased use of community
service has received widespread support. Id. at 426-27. Case law examining the
legality of ordering community service as a condition of probation has not been
established. Id. at 427. This form of restitution is presumably not challenged because
service provides a less onerous alternative than incarceration for defendants who fail
to meet the conditions of probation. It is likely that challenges to service restitution
ordered in conjunction with incarceration will be made because of the absence of
such an "alternative." See id.
81. Id. at 440. The notion that service restitution serves as an alternative to
incarceration is explored in detail by Professor Harland who concludes that service
does not actually serve as such an alternative. See id. at 441-51.
82. The VWPA allows a court to impose restitution "in addition to or in lieu of
any other penalty authorized by law." 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982).
83. Harland II, supra note 77, at 440; Laster, supra note 32, at 91; see People v.
Good, 287 Mich. 110, 115, 282 N.W. 920, 923 (1938) (offender has option of serving
jail term or fulfilling conditions of probation). Professor Harland discusses the theory
of defendant consent to conditions of probation. Harland II, supra note 77, at 451-
54. Consent may be viewed as a "strained fiction." Id. at 453. But see Teleconference
Tapes, supra note 1, side 1 of 5 (statement of Judge G.B. Tjoflat, 11th Cir.) (defend-
ants almost universally consent to the conditions of probation).
84. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
85. Harland II, supra note 77, at 440.
86. Service restitution is offered as a sentencing option to provide the court with
the necessary flexibility to compensate the victim and to provide for maximum
rehabilitation of the offender. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 32, reprinted in
1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2538.
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restitution are unavailable.8 7 An affluent defendant, therefore, could
avoid a service requirement while an indigent defendant may not be
able to avoid such a requirement.88 The result is "a situation in which
offenders who can afford to pay may buy themselves out of a work
assignment, while those without financial resources must submit to
the service penalty or be incarcerated." 9 The conversion of financial
restitution into service restitution for indigent offenders may unconsti-
tutionally raise the ceiling of punishment for those offenders.90
87. See Harland II, supra note 77, at 459. Professor Harland notes the discrimi-
natory potential associated with using service restitution as an alternative to financial
sanctions and states that "serious thought must be given to the propriety of replacing
one class of people bound to involuntary servitude on the basis of race by another
class similarly bound on the basis of a criminal conviction and economic status." Id.
He further notes that "[o]ne aspect of selecting offenders to perform ... service that
may lead to immediate legal difficulties is the practice of selecting offenders on the
basis of their inability to pay monetary penalties." Id. at 465. The option of service
restitution in lieu of a financial sanction is particularly popular when "there is an
inability to pay restitution." Harland I, supra note 30, at 118. The Probation Depart-
ment has adopted the position that the Act allows community service restitution as an
alternative to unavailable financial restitution. The Department has stated that
"[w]hen it appears to be inappropriate or almost impossible for the defendant to
repay the amount lost. .. , the Probation Officer may wish to suggest to the Court
an alternative means of restitution such as general community service." Victim
Impact Statements 8 (Nov. 28, 1983) (memorandum from Michael J. Luciano, Chief
U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services Officer, S.D.N.Y.) [hereinafter cited as Proba-
tion Dep't Memorandum]. The Probation Department conclusion is supported by the
legislative history of the Act, which indicates that service restitution is offered as a
sentencing option to further the compensatory and rehabilitative goals of the VWPA.
See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2538. Personal service restitution has an "aura of indentured servitude."
Probation Dep't Memorandum, supra, at 8. In recognition of the problem of service
restitution performed for the victim, as opposed to general community service, the
Probation Department discourages the use of personal service as an alternative to
financial restitution. Id.
88. See Harland I, supra note 30, at 118; Harland II, supra note 77, at 465.
89. Harland I, supra note 30, at 118.
90. Id. The constitutionality of service restitution as an alternative to unavailable
financial restitution is premised on Supreme Court decisions relating to the automatic
conversion of fines into incarceration. In Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), the
Court held that "the Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a
sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the
defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full." Id. at 398 (quoting
Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970)). The premise of this conclusion was
that "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the
statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any substantive offense be the same for
all defendants irrespective of their economic status." Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235, 244 (1970). The premise of Tate is equally applicable to financial restitution
converted to service restitution if there is an inability to pay. See Harland I, supra
note 30, at 118. But cf. United States v. Weiner, 376 F.2d 42, 43 (3d Cir. 1967)
(restitution distinguished from costs); Sprague v. State, 590 P.2d 410, 415 (Alaska
1979) (restitution distinguished from fines); State v. Garner, 115 Ariz. 579, 581, 566
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The existence of this problem depends on whether the choice of
service restitution is available only following the court's decision to
order restitution. 91 No potential for discrimination exists when the
decision to order service follows the initial affirmative decision to
impose restitution because restitution will be ordered only if the de-
fendant has financial capability to comply with the order. The judge
will not consider whether to order service as a means to ensure the
receipt of restitution. The legislative history indicates, however, that
service restitution is offered as an option "to provide the court with
. . . flexibility in determining the kind of restitution which would
both satisfy the victim and provide maximum rehabilitative incentives
to the offender. '92 This flexibility could give rise to the unconstitu-
tional application of service restitution to indigent defendants. 3
D. The Victim
The VWPA provides for restitution to "any victim of the offense. 94
This section addresses the definition of "victim" as it relates to non-
human victims and third parties who reimburse the actual victim.
1. Non-Human Victims
Neither the Act nor the legislative history clearly indicates whether
non-human victims are within the scope of the Act. 95 One judge
concluded, however, that "the tone of the legislative history . . .
concerns itself with the physical, emotional and financial problems of
individuals affected by crime, not organizations. ' 96 This conclusion is
justified in light of the circumstances in which the VWPA was en-
P.2d 1055, 1057 (1977) (same); State v. Gunderson, 74 Wash. 2d 226, 230, 444 P.2d
156, 159-60 (1968) (payment to victim is not a fine).
91. The court is to consider the financial resources of the defendant, as well as his
ability to make restitution, when determining whether to order restitution, and if so,
the amount. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a) (1982); Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 2
of 5 (statement of F. Bennett, Federal Public Defender, D. Md.); see id. side 3 of 5
(statement of F. Bennett, Federal Public Defender, D. Md.) (defense should establish
a lack of financial resources of defendant to forestall any application of the Act
whatsoever); id. side 4 of 5 (question and answer session) (indigency forestalls any
application of the Act whatsoever).
92. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2538. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 90.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982). The Act does not define the term "victim." See
id.
95. See Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 18.
96. Altimari, supra note 20, at 14. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1512 note (1982)
(Federal Guidelines for Treatment of Crime Victims and Witnesses in the Criminal
Justice System) (findings and purposes of Act reflect suffering by victims due to
physical, psychological, and financial hardships).
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acted. Congress was responding to the frustration and anger of victims
who felt lost and forgotten by the criminal justice system. 7
A broad interpretation of the term "victim" to include persons,
organizations, and the government, however, has been suggested. 8
The broad definition should be adopted despite the legislative indica-
tions to the contrary. Defendants should not be relieved of their
obligation to make restitution simply because of the victim's iden-
tity. 9 In addition, it is inequitable not to compensate corporate or
organizational victims who suffer losses that ultimately are borne by
the consumer or shareholder. 100 For example, in the hypothetical
crime, the banks' losses will ultimately be borne by the shareholders.
The VWPA therefore should be construed or amended to reflect this
policy.
2. Third Party Reimbursement
In the hypothetical crime an insurance company reimbursed the
bank $10,000 of the $20,000 loss resulting from the robbery. Assume
further that the assaulted teller's medical expenses were partially paid
by a relative. Under the Act, restitution is not available for losses for
which the victim has received or is to receive compensation. The
VWPA allows the court, in the "interest of justice," to order restitu-
tion to any person who has compensated the victim for losses sus-
tained. 1 1 The circumstances under which a third-party reimburser is
entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the victim, however, were
not delineated. The sentencing judge clearly has the power to order
97. See supra note 1.
98. Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3. North Carolina has enacted a
restitution statute that is comparable to this broad view. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1343(d) (1983) ("victim" defined as "individuals, firms, corporations, associations or
other organizations, and government agencies, whether federal, State or local").
99. Restitution fosters a defendant's acceptance of his or her unlawful actions.
United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907, 912 (D. Md. 1981). To permit a
defendant admittedly guilty of causing loss to avoid making the victim whole is
violative of public policy. Id.; see United States v. Buechler, 557 F.2d 1002, 1007 (3d
Cir. 1977) (crime should not be profitable); People v. Gallagher, 55 Mich. App. 613,
619, 223 N.W.2d 92, 95 (1974) (same).
100. The problems of disallowing restitution to non-human victims are analogous
to those associated with failing to allow insurers to be subrogated to the rights of the
victim-offenders escape liability while consumers and shareholders bear the burden
of loss. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(e)(1) (1982); see Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 1
of 5 (statement of L. Schwartz, Benjamin Franklin Prof. of Law, Univ. of Pa.)
(unclear how one is to determine when and if it is in the interest of justice to allow
subrogation). One federal district court judge has ordered restitution to a surety
company that reimbursed a banking institution which was the victim of an offense.
Record at 46, United States v. Florence, No. 83-175 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 4, 1983)
(proceedings at sentencing), appeal docketed, No. 83-2-537 (8th Cir. Nov. 17, 1983).
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the defendants to make restitution to the relative who has paid a
portion of the bank teller's medical expenses. Less clear, however, is
whether a corporate entity such as the bank's insurance company may
be the proper recipient of a restitution order.
The legislative history contains contradictory statements regarding
the payment of restitution to insurance companies.1 02 In one instance
the legislative history calls for restitution to be limited to "out-of-
pocket (for example, uninsured) medical expenses."'01 3 By implication,
insurance companies could not receive restitution. Other portions of
the legislative history recognize, however, that "[t]he common prac-
tice of not permitting insurance companies to be subrogated to the
rights of insured victims means that some offenders are being relieved
of their debts. It also means that insurance companies and the insur-
ance-buying public are being asked to pay off the offender's debt."10 4
For example, the bank in the hypothetical crime may be required to
pay higher insurance premiums in the future, which would affect the
shareholders of the bank.
The Federal Probation Act and several states have limited restitu-
tion to aggrieved parties, thereby precluding third parties from receiv-
ing restitution. 105 Although it is generally agreed that restricting resti-
tution is essential to prevent dilution of its rehabilitative benefits,106
the compensatory goal of the Act suggests that it is proper for third-
102. Compare Senate Report, supra note 1, at 31 (supporting insurers' right to
receive restitution), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2537, with
128 Cong. Rec. S3854 (daily ed. April 22, 1982) (statement of Sen. Heinz) (limit
restitution to uninsured losses) and 128 Cong. Rec. S3860 (daily ed. April 22, 1982)
(statement of Sen. Chiles) (limit restitution to out-of-pocket expenses).
103. 128 Cong. Rec. S3854 (daily ed. April 22, 1982) (statement of Sen. Heinz).
104. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2537; see Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 18 (insurance company
may receive restitution if it compensates victim for loss).
105. See, e.g., Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981, 986-87 (9th Cir.) (restitu-
tion ordered pursuant to Probation Act could not include individuals not connected
with counts for which defendant was convicted), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950);
United States v. Follette, 32 F. Supp. 953, 955 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (restitution limited to
persons directly injured by criminal acts). Several state courts have held that insurers
are ineligible to receive restitution. See, e.g., People v. Daugherty, 104 Ill. App. 3d
89, 93, 432 N.E.2d 391, 394 (1982); People v. Grago, 24 Misc. 2d 739, 742, 204
N.Y.S.2d 774, 778 (Oneida County Ct. 1960); State v. Getsinger, 27 Or. App. 339,
341-42, 556 P.2d 147, 148 (1976). But see State v. Murray, 621 P.2d 334, 338-39
(Hawaii 1980) (state reimbursed victim and would be entitled to receive restitution
from offender); Flores v. State, 513 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (insurers
are entitled to receive restitution).
Some states have adopted statutory provisions allowing restitution to be ordered to
insurers who reimburse victims. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 99-37-1(d) (Supp.
1983); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-17-1(A)(1) (1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.103(4) (1981).
106. State v. Stalheim, 275 Or. 683, 688, 552 P.2d 829, 832 (1976); cf. Watson v.
State, 17 Md. App. 263, 274, 301 A.2d 26, 31-32 (1973) (restitution as condition of
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party reimbursers, such as insurance companies, to receive restitution
under the Act.10 7
E. Multiple Victims
The hypothetical crime involves several victims who may be eligible
to receive restitution. Two banks, bank employees and customers
were all victimized. The VWPA provides that direct victims of of-
fenses are entitled to receive restitution before compensation may be
ordered for those who reimburse victims.108 The Act is silent, how-
ever, on the priority of payments when multiple direct victims are
involved. If a convicted offender has the financial ability to make full
restitution to all victims, this issue is of no consequence. The more
usual case, however, will involve a defendant with limited financial
resources. 10 9 In those instances the court must allocate the limited
resources among the victims. 10
Various methods may be used to allocate restitution to the victims.
Allocation of the defendant's resources may be made on the basis of
victims' financial need, thus favoring the indigent victim. For exam-
ple, the money and jewelry stolen from a bank customer may repre-
sent a substantially higher percentage of his wealth than the $20,000
loss represents to the bank. The VWPA, however, was not enacted "to
limit restitution to the financially needy.""' In addition, an examina-
tion of victim needs would introduce an additional element into the
sentencing hearing that could "unduly prolong or complicate the
sentencing process."'" 2 A second alternative is to allocate on the basis
of severity of injury. This would also prolong and complicate the
probation should be easily comprehended by offender). But see People v. Miller, 256
Cal. App. 2d 348, 356, 64 Cal. Rptr. 20, 25 (1967) (rehabilitation requires that
defendant's probation be conditioned on realities of the situation without unneces-
sary technical limitations in determining scope of the offense for which defendant
was convicted).
107. See 128 Cong. Rec. H8201 (daily ed. September 30, 1982) (statement of Rep.
Rodino) (restitution should be ordered for purpose of making victim financially
whole, but also serves function of rehabilitating offender). For an insightful discus-
sion of the rehabilitative aspects of restitution, see Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790,
798-99, 266 N.W.2d 403, 407 (1978).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(e)(1) (1982); see Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at
18.
109. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Report to the
Nation on Crime and Justice 38 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Report to the Nation].
See infra notes 370-71 and accompanying text.
110. See Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 4 of 5 (statement of Chief Judge
Wm. T. Hodges, M.D. Fla.) (judge must establish restitution priorities as between
victims).
111. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 13, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2519.
112. See supra note 15.
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sentencing process as relative harm would have to be determined." 3
Allocation on the basis of severity of injury would be further compli-
cated in instances of both human and non-human victims because the
sentencing judge would be required to weigh the injuries of an indi-
vidual against those of an entity. For example, in the hypothetical
crime the physical injury of the bank teller would be weighed against
the property loss of the bank.
A simpler approach, and one that avoids the problems of the other
alternatives, is available. The court would determine the maximum
restitution award that each victim would be entitled to if the defend-
ant had financial ability to make full restitution. The court would
then pro-rate each award in relation to the amount of available funds.
F. Multiple Defendants
The VWPA fails to provide guidance for the sentencing judge to
allocate restitution when there are multiple defendants." 4 Depending
upon the method adopted to deal with multiple defendants, there may
be problems of "unduly prolonging or complicating the sentencing
process" or of allowing restitution to become a windfall recovery for
victims.
One alternative would require apportionment of restitution based
upon the relative culpability of each defendant." 5 For example, the
court would be required to consider which of the two defendants in
the hypothetical crime was more at fault than the other, and would be
forced to determine which of the defendants actually assaulted the
teller and which one stole the car. The traditional and widespread
rule at common law forbids the apportionment of liability as between
joint tortfeasors.116 This rule protects injured parties by making all of
the wrongdoers completely liable for all damages suffered. In addi-
tion, the rule avoids the situation in which an injured party is unable
to collect a part of the amount required to compensate him which is
assessed solely against an insolvent defendant. Furthermore, a re-
quirement that the court weigh fault and apportion liability is likely
113. See injra note 116 and accompanying text.
114. United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516, 526-27 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (court
dealing with three defendants questioned which basis to use when calculating
amount of restitution that each should be ordered to pay), appeal docketed, No. 83-
7-444 (l1th Cir. Aug. 8, 1983), petition for writ of mandamus filed sub nom. In re
United States, No. 83-7-583 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 1983); Bennett, supra note 20, at 3.
115, See Bennett, supra note 20, at 3.
116. See, e.g., Washington Gas Light Co. v. Lansden, 172 U.S. 534, 552 (1898);
Hooks v. Vet, 192 F. 314, 315 (5th Cir. 1911); Ferris v. Hotel Pick Arms, Inc., 147
Conn. 72, 74, 157 A.2d 106, 108 (1959); Heath v. Thurmon, 68 Misc. 2d 314, 315,
327 N.Y.S.2d 410, 412 (1971).
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to prolong and complicate the sentencing process. 117 Finally, appor-
tionment according to relative culpability is contrary to the general
rule that each criminal is jointly and severally liable." 8
Another alternative is to divide the total restitutionary requirement
by the number of convicted offenders." 9 Although this alternative is
simple to apply, full recovery is unlikely as an individual defendant
may be unable to fulfill his restitutionary obligation.
A third alternative is to order full restitution by each defendant as
though he were the only offender. This alternative is consistent with
restitution being part of the sentence, and therefore, the restitution
order would be determined as would any other form of punishment
which is not allocated among the defendants. Full restitution by each
offender also avoids the need to determine relative guilt, but may
result in duplicative recoveries by the victim. The statute does not
favor such duplicative recoveries and it intends to prevent restitution
from becoming a "windfall for a victim."'120
A final alternative is to adopt joint and several liability.' 12 Joint and
several liability satisfies the statutory goal of compensation. This the-
ory of liability is also consistent with the traditional notion that each
defendant should be liable for the entire amount of restitution until
the victim is fully compensated. 22 This rule should be modified,
117. See Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 10; Probation Dep't Memoran-
dum, supra note 87, at 6.
118. See, e.g., People v. Goss, 109 Cal. App. 3d 443, 460, 167 Cal. Rptr. 224, 234
(1980); People v. Flores, 197 Cal. App. 2d 611, 616, 17 Cal. Rptr. 382, 385 (1961);
People v. Peterson, 62 Mich. App. 258, 267-68, 233 N.W.2d 250, 255-56 (1975). But
see People v. Kay, 36 Cal. App. 3d 759, 763, 111 Cal. Rptr. 894, 896 (1973) (court
must consider roles of others who caused damage, however, there was a large
number of individuals responsible for damage and small number actually convicted);
State ex rel. D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 507-08, 361 A.2d 513, 523-24 (1976) (rebuttable
presumption that parties are each equally liable for proportionate share).
119. See State ex rel. D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 507-08, 361 A.2d 513, 523-24 (1976);
Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 10. This view is an exception to the general
rule. See infra note 122.
120. Bennett, supra note 20, at 3; see 18 U.S.C. § 3579(e)(1) (1982) (no restitution
to victim with respect to losses for which he has received or will receive compensa-
tion); id. § 3579(e)(2) (set-off provision in event victim subsequently receives civil
judgment for damages).
121. See People v. Goss, 109 Cal. App. 3d 443, 460-61, 167 Cal. Rptr. 224, 234,
(1980); People v. Flores, 197 Cal. App. 2d 611, 616, 17 Cal. Rptr. 382, 385 (1961);
People v. Peterson, 62 Mich. App. 258, 268, 233 N.W.2d 250, 256 (1975); Justice
Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 10. But see People v. Kay, 36 Cal. App. 3d 759,
763, 111 Cal. Rptr. 894, 895-96 (1973) (court must consider role of others who caused
damage, however, there was a large number of individuals responsible for damage
and small number actually convicted); State ex rel D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 507-08, 361
A.2d 513, 523-24 (1976) (rebuttable presumption that parties are each equally liable
for proportionate share).
122. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 52, at 314-15 (4th ed. 1971)
(it is well-settled in criminal law that when two or more persons act in concert each is
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however, by the statutory requirement that the judge consider the
defendant's financial circumstances. 2 3 Accordingly, a cap should be
placed upon each defendant's liability in accord with this restriction.
G. Appeals and Stay of Restitution Orders Pending Appeal
The VWPA may affect appeal rights of the defendant, the govern-
ment, and the victim. Although the statute does not explicitly address
these rights of appeal, 2 4 various provisions of the Act suggest the
possibility of modification of appeal rights. This section examines the
potential changes and analyzes whether a restitution order should be
stayed pending appeal.
1. Appeal Rights
The bank in the hypothetical crime suffered a loss of $20,000.
Assume that the bank was reimbursed $10,000 from its insurer and
received restitution of $5000, leaving a net loss to the bank of $5000.
The bank, dissatisfied with this restitution award, seeks to be compen-
sated for the $5000 shortfall left unreimbursed by the restitution
recovery and the insurance reimbursement. This raises the issue
whether the bank may appeal a restitution order to recover the addi-
tional $5000. A victim's right of appeal under the VWPA may be
inferred from the victim's increased participation in the criminal
justice process' 25 or the requirement that a judge who does not order
liable for entire result). But see People v. Kay, 36 Cal. App. 3d 759, 763, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 894, 896 (1973) (court must consider roles of others who cause damage); State
ex rel. D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 507-08, 361 A.2d 513, 523-24 (1976) (established
rebuttable presumption that parties are equally liable for a proportionate share).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a) (1982). Two judges in the Northern District of Georgia
have adopted a similar alternative-each defendant is liable for full restitution unless
there is apportionment and the court is to consider the ability of each co-defendant to
contribute. Order to Facilitate Implementation of VWPA at 3 (N.D. Ga. June 27,
1983) (Moye, C.J.); Order to Facilitate Implementation of VWPA at 3 (N.D. Ga.
June 17, 1983) (O'Kelley, J.).
124. Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 19. Although the VWPA is silent
regarding appeal rights, it is significant to note that the Criminal Code Reform Act of
1981, S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), a predecessor bill to the VWPA, specifi-
cally provided for a defendant's right to appeal a sentence that included a restitution
order. 1981 Senate Report, supra note 15, at 1000.
125. The Act promotes victim participation in several ways. For example, in the
only reference to plea negotiation and restitution, it recommends that the victim be
consulted prior to any disposition of the case. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 note (1982) (Federal
Guidelines for Treatment of Crime Victims and Witnesses in the Criminal Justice
System). There is disagreement regarding the extent to which a prosecutor is bound
by the victim's wishes. One view requires "full approval" by the victim to a plea
arrangement. See Bennett, supra note 20, at 6. Alternatively, the prosecutor should
only advocate restitution when there is no conflict with prosecutorial duties. See
Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3. Preservation of prosecutorial discretion
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restitution or orders only partial restitution must state his reasons for
so doing. 12 6 In addition, in United States v. Welden,127 the court
questioned whether a victim has a right of appeal because the defend-
ant may appeal the restitution order, and in civil cases, both sides may
appeal. 2 While a sentencing process that includes restitution has
some of the characteristics of a civil action, 2 the essential nature of
the proceeding remains criminal-sentencing the offender. Therefore,
no appeal right vests in the victim merely because the defendant has
such a right.
The VWPA contains no express provision granting the victim an
appeal right, 13° and an appeal right found by implication would
contravene the rule of lenity' 3' because the victim would expose the
defendant to liability a second time. 32 In addition, the VWPA does
as well as a strict construction of the statute preclude binding the prosecutor to the
victim's position. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 note (1982) (Federal Guidelines for Treatment of
Crime Victims and Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System) requires consultation
but there is no explicit requirement that the prosecutor abide by the victim's wishes.
But see Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1203(5) (1977) (concurrence of defendant, victim and
prosecutor required to establish amount of restitution).
In addition to consultation, victims may have an opportunity to address the court
at the time of sentencing. Office of the Attorney General, Guidelines for Victim and
Witness Assisitance, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,774, 33,776 (1983); see Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 921.143 (West Supp. 1982) (victim has right to make statement at sentencing):
Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 22 (victim may have right to make state-
ment at hearing). It has been suggested, however, that victim testimony at the
sentencing hearing is not preferred. Id. at 22 (sentencing hearing should be accom-
plished in least burdensome way for victim, court, and system). Discouraging victim
testimony aids in providing the "simplest, most unencumbered method of handling
[the] sentencing hearing." Id. at 4; accord id. at 22. In lieu of victim testimony, the
prosecutor would present an affidavit from the victim or make an equivalent presen-
tation. Id. at 22. Such information would be used in conjunction with the presen-
tence report and the Victim Impact Statement to compute the entire sentence. See id.
Affidavits or prosecutor presentations, however, may not be sufficient. In order to
demonstrate damage or loss, victim testimony at the sentencing hearing should be
allowed as it may be more persuasive than written statements. Victim allocution at
sentencing "ensure[s] that the victim's side is heard and considered by the adjudica-
tive officials." Senate Report, supra note 1, at 13, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 2519; see Press & LaBrecque, Giving Victims a Say in Court,
Newsweek, March 14, 1983, at 51 ("a flesh and blood victim may . . . sway a
judge").
126. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(2) (1982).
127. 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-7-444 (11th Cir.
Aug. 8, 1983), petition for writ of mandamus filed sub nom. In re United States, No.
83-7-583 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 1983).
128. Id. at 530.
129. See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 124.
131. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
132. A defendant's sentence is subject to review and increase under certain cir-
cumstances. For example, the court may substitute a valid sentence for an invalid one
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not address or enumerate appeal rights of the government and the
defendant, and no other statute grants the government the right to
appeal a judge's failure to order restitution. 133 Traditionally, the right
of appeal is construed against the government. 134 Thus, the govern-
ment has no right to appeal restitution orders because no right is
enumerated. A defendant's right to appeal an order of restitution
should be the same as his right to appeal any other sentence. 3 5 Resti-
tution is a criminal penalty; consequently the usual rights of sentence
and appellate review 36 are not restricted by the Act.
even if the new sentence is more severe. United States v. Thomas, 356 F. Supp. 173,
174 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1336 (2d Cir. 1972). In addition, a sentence may be
declared void by the court because of the absence of the defendant's counsel at the
time of the pronouncement. If this is done the court may increase the term on
resentence on the theory that the void sentence was non-existent. United States v.
Howell, 103 F. Supp. 714, 718 (S.D.W. Va.), aff'd, 199 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1952).
Finally, even after the service of a sentence has commenced, the court may make the
sentence more severe if it is necessary to bring the sentence up to the minimum
required by statute. Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 165-67 (1947); United
States v. Allen, 588 F.2d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1979); Burns v. United States, 552 F.2d
828, 831 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Stevens, 548 F.2d 1360, 1362-63 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975 (1977).
133. The statute controlling government appeal rights, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1982),
does not provide for a right to appeal a failure to order restitution. Congress may,
however, broaden the government's right to appeal in relation to sentence review.
See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 149 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983
Senate Report]. Congress seeks to "preserve the concept that the discretion of a
sentencing judge has a proper place in sentencing [that] should not be displaced by
the discretion of an appellate court." Id. at 150. This concept is to be maintained,
however, while promoting "fairness and rationality, and [reducing] unwarranted
disparity, in sentencing." Id. The Senate Report describes the need for statutory
changes:
It is clearly desirable, in the interest of reducing unwarranted sentence
disparity, to permit the government, on behalf of the public, to appeal and
have increased a sentence that is below the applicable guideline and that is
found to be unreasonable. If only the defendant could appeal his sentence,
there would be no effective opportunity for the reviewing courts to correct
the injustice arising from a sentence that was patently too lenient.
Id. at 151. The proposed statute would thus equalize the appellate rights of defend-
ants and prosecutors regarding sentences. Id. at 51-52, 151.
134. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1967); United States v. Mersky,
361 U.S. 431, 438 (1960); United States v. Apex Distrib. Co., 270 F.2d 747, 751 (9th
Cir. 1959); United States v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 252 F.2d 420, 422 (1st Cir. 1958).
No appeal rights exist other than those enumerated. See Bennett, supra note 20, at 7;
Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 2 of 5 (statement of F. Bennett, Federal
Public Defender, D. Md.).
135. See Bennett, supra note 20, at 7 (right to appeal a restitution order would be
part and parcel of defendant's general right of appeal); Justice Dep't Guidelines,
supra note 9, at 19 (restitution order is part of defendant's sentence and is appeala-
ble).
136. Bennett, supra note 20, at 7. Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure continues to control the review of sentences, including restitution, by the
sentencing court. See Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 19.
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2. Staying an Order of Restitution Pending Appeal
The stay of a sentence pending appeal is controlled by Rule 38 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 38 does not include a
provision relating to restitution ordered in conjunction with incarcer-
ation or other forms of sentencing. The VWPA fails to address
whether the restitution order may be stayed pending appeal. 37 The
compensatory goal of the VWPA suggests that restitution should not
be stayed pending appeal. 3 The defendant's interest in preserving his
funds, should he ultimately prevail, suggests an opposite conclusion.
Restitution, as part of a sentence, should be stayed pending appeal.
Restitution ordered as a condition of probation may be stayed under
Rule 38.'13 Moreover, Rule 38 provides for the stay of the payment of
fines and costs pending appeal. 140 The Rule contains provisions to
assure payment by allowing the court to require the offender to
deposit all or part of the amount due with the registry of the court.'
This ensures the availability of the funds to the party in whose favor
the appeal is ultimately decided.
An alternative approach would require the payment of restitution
to the victim pending appeal. 42 This is supported by the Justice
Department's perception of the Act's intent "to make victims as whole
as possible, as soon as possible through restitution. Since an appeal
may take years, the court should be encouraged to require the defend-
ant to make restitution payments pending appeal."' 143 This approach
ignores the defendant's interest in preserving his funds should he
prevail on appeal. Rule 38 should be amended to provide for the stay,
137. The VWPA's silence is puzzling. The Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981, S.
1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), a predecessor bill to the VWPA, provided that a
restitution order may be stayed pending appeal or sentence review. 1981 Senate
Report, supra note 15, at 1000.
138. See Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 20 (victim should be made
whole as soon as possible: appeal process may create long delays in victim compensa-
tion).
139. Fed. R. Crim. P. 38(a)(4) (conditions of probation may be stayed pending
appeal).
140. Id. R. 38(a)(3). Because both fines and financial restitution are sentences
involving the payment of money by the offender, the fines and costs provisions of
Rule 38 provide a ready analogy. A number of cases, however, have distinguished
restitution orders from sentences to pay fines and costs. See, e.g., United States v.
Weiner, 376 F.2d 42, 43 (3d Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (restitution distinguished from
costs); Sprague v. State, 590 P.2d 410, 415 (Alaska 1979) (restitution distinguished
from fines); State v. Garner, 115 Ariz. 579, 581, 566 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1977) (same);
State v. Gunderson, 74 Wash. 2d 226, 230, 444 P.2d 156, 159-60 (1968) (payment
made to victim of crime is restitution, not fine).
141. Fed. R. Crim. P. 38(a)(3).
142. See Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 19-20.
143. Id. at 20.
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pending appeal, of restitution ordered in conjunction with another
form of sentence. 44 The provisions presently applicable to fines and
costs should be utilized.145
This section analyzed key terms of the Act as well as additional
problems presented by the Act's failure to address various issues. The
next section examines the procedural considerations that arise from
the introduction of restitution as a component of sentencing.
II. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS AND PLEA BARGAINING
Restitution is a unique form of criminal sentence that borrows
several concepts from the civil law of torts. 46 Under the VWPA,
restitution is similar to a tort remedy because the Act seeks to compen-
sate the victim for the violation of his private rights. 47 The VWPA
also gives the victim the right to enforce the restitution order as if it
were a civil judgment. 4 Moreover, the defendant is estopped from
denying the essential facts of the offense underlying a restitution order
in a subsequent civil action. 49
144. Congress has proposed an amendment to Rule 38 that would allow restitu-
tion ordered as a component of sentencing to be stayed pending appeal. 1983 Senate
Report, supra note 133, at 537. The proposed amendment provides the same assur-
ances regarding the availability of the funds as the present Rule 38 provisions for fines
and costs. The court may require the offender to deposit all or part of the restitution
amount with the court registry. See id.
145. See 1981 Senate Report, supra note 15, at 1000 (provisions relating to the stay
of fines and costs should be applied to restitution orders).
146. State v. Dillon, 637 P.2d 602, 606-07 (Oregon 1981); Legislation to Revise
and Recodify Federal Criminal Laws, 1977-78: Hearings on H.R. 6869 Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. 2602 (1977-1978) (comments of the Business Roundtable on the
sentencing provisions of the Proposed Federal Criminal Code) [hereinafter cited as
Business Roundtable Discussion]; N. Cohen & J. Gobert, The Law of Probation and
Parole § 6.39, at 291 (1983); see Senate Report, supra note 1, at 30, reprinted in 1982
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2536 (purpose of restitution is to make the victim
whole); 128 Cong. Rec. H8201 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (statement of Rep. Rodino)
(same).
147. Compare J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 241 (2d ed. 1960) (tort
remedy compensates victim) and W. Prosser, supra note 122, § 2, at 7 (same) with
Senate Report, supra note 1, at 30 (purpose of restitution provisions is to have
offender make good the harm he has caused the victim), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 2536. In the middle ages, the goal of victim compensation was
severed from the criminal law and became part of the civil law of torts. S. Schafer,
Compensation and Restitution to Victims of Crime 11-12 (2d ed. 1970); Jacob, The
Concept of Restitution: An Historical Overview, in Restitution in Criminal Justice
45, 47 (J. Hudson & B. Galaway eds. 1970). Compensation remedies a violation of an
individual's rights; other types of sentences seek to punish the defendant for the
violation of public rights. 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries § 5, at 2152 (W. Jones ed.
1916); J. Hall, supra, at 241; W. Prosser, supra note 122, § 2, at 7.
148. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h) (1982). See infra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
149. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(e) (1982). See infra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, restitution under the VWPA is also a form of criminal
sentencing'50 and is intended to serve other goals. 15 As a sentence,
restitution is intended to assist in rehabilitation'5 2 by helping the
defendant to understand his social responsibility 53 and the impact of
the crime upon the victim. 54 Restitution also achieves the retributive
purpose of punishment by providing the defendant with a construc-
tive opportunity to pay his debt to society and the victim. 151 Before
150. See 128 Cong. Rec. H8467 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Rep.
McCollum) ("Restitution would become a sentence that could, in and of itself, be
imposed."); 128 Cong. Rec. S11,436 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1982) (statement of Sen.
Mathias) ("[This Act] [p]ermit[s], for the first time, a Federal judge to order restitu-
tion as part of the sentence for crimes involving loss of property or personal injury."):
128 Cong. Rec. S3860 (daily ed. April 22, 1982) (statement of Sen. Chiles) ("[It
provides the remedy of restitution as a sentencing tool for judges .... ); see also
State v. Lack, 98 N.M. 500, 508, 650 P.2d 22, 30 (1982) (restitution must be
considered part of sentencing process); Commonwealth v. Fuqua, 267 Pa. Super.
504, 509-10, 407 A.2d 24, 27 (1979) (restitution is a criminal sentence).
151. 128 Cong. Rec. H8201 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (statement of Rep. Rodino);
see 1981 Senate Report, supra note 15, at 1001; see also Laster, supra note 32, at 80
(criminal restitution has two purposes: to restore victim and aid in offender's rehabil-
itation).
152. 128 Cong. Rec. H8201 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (statement of Rep. Rodino)
(quoting Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 798, 266 N.W.2d 403, 407 (1978)); see
Senate Report, supra note 1, at 32, reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
2538; Laster, supra note 32, at 80. Several state courts have recognized that restitu-
tion achieves the goal of rehabilitation. People v. Richards, 17 Cal. 3d 614, 622, 552
P.2d 97, 102, 131 Cal. Rptr. 537, 542 (1976); State v. Harris, 70 N.J. 586, 592-93,
362 A.2d 32, 34-35 (1976); State v. Killian, 245 S.E.2d 812, 815 (N.C. App. 1978);
Commonwealth v. Fuqua, 267 Pa. Super. 504, 507-08, 407 A.2d 24, 25-26 (1979);
Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 798, 266 N.W.2d 403, 407 (1978). A number of
state statutes explicitly recognize the rehabilitative importance of restitution as a
criminal sanction. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1201 (1977); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 299B.13 (West Supp. 1984); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-37-3(2) (Supp. 1983); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 31-17-1(D) (1978); Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.106(2) (1981); S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. § 23A-28-5 (1979). But see Harland I, supra note 30, at 123 (there is little
empirical data to support theory that restitution assists defendant's rehabilitation).
153. Schafer, supra note 34, at 250; Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 2 of
5 (statement of D. Chamlee, Deputy Chief Probation Division, Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts); see People v. Richards, 17 Cal. 3d 614, 622, 552 P.2d 97, 102,
131 Cal. Rptr. 537, 542 (1976); Huggett v.State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 798, 266 N.W.2d
403, 407 (1978).
154. Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 807, 266 N.W.2d 403, 411 (1978) (Callow,
J., dissenting); S. Schafer, supra note 147, at 135; see United States v. Buechler, 557
F.2d 1002, 1007 (3d Cir. 1977); People v. Lippner, 219 Cal. 395, 399, 26 P.2d 457,
458 (1933).
155. S. Schafer, supra note 147, at 135; see Cohen, The Integration of Restitution
in the Probation Services, 34 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 315, 316 (1944); Harland I,
supra note 30, at 125; see also Senate Report, supra note 1, at 30 ("The premise of the
section is that the court in devising just sanctions for adjudicated offenders, should
insure that the wrongdoer [will] make [good], to the degree possible, the harm he has
caused his victim."), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2536.
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ordering restitution, therefore, a court must balance the victim's right
to compensation against these other goals of criminal sentencing.1 56
The defendant's rights in this hybrid sentencing procedure must be
protected. If the defendant were sued by the victim in a tort action,
the defendant would be afforded a number of procedural safeguards
not available at criminal sentencing,15 7 including the right to a jury,
the right to call and cross-examine witnesses, and the protection pro-
vided by the rules of evidence. 15 8
This section discusses the procedures required to implement this
hybrid sentence without violating the defendant's constitutional
rights. 59 In addition, because plea bargaining plays an important role
Further, it has been noted that restitution can act as an effective deterrent. Harland
I, supra note 30, at 125; see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-2a(2) (West 1982).
156. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 2538. See infra notes 196-210 and accompanying text.
157. See Business Roundtable Discussion, supra note 146, at 2602; N. Cohen & J.
Gobert, supra note 146, § 6.39, at 291; Lundberg, Criminal Law-Defendant's
Rights- Abridged When Probation Decree Contains Condition of "Damages" Type
Restitution, 30 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 215, 216 (1958); see also State v. Sullivan, 24 Or.
App. 99, 105-06, 544 P.2d 616, 619 (1976) (Schwabb, C.J., dissenting) ("The defend-
ant is being deprived of property without an opportunity to be heard.... [T]he
majority approves joinder of questions of criminal liability with questions of liability
for civil damages for trial, but then does not allow a trial on civil liability.").
158. See People v. Richards, 17 Cal. 3d 614, 620, 552 P.2d 97, 101, 131 Cal. Rptr.
537, 541 (1976); State v. Stalheim, 275 Or. 683, 688, 552 P.2d 829, 831 (1976); N.
Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 146, § 6.39, at 291; Note, Rehabilitation of the
Victims of Crime: An Overview, 21 UCLA L. Rev. 317, 327 & n.50 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Rehabilitation of Victims]; Altimari, supra note 20, at 19.
159. The Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982), provides useful analogies to aid
in interpreting various terms of the VWPA. See supra pt. I. There are, however,
basic differences between the two acts that preclude using the Probation Act as a
basis for establishing procedures for the VWPA. The nature of a restitution order
under the VWPA is substantially different from restitution under the Probation Act.
See United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516, 535 (N.D. Ala. 1983), appeal
docketed, No. 83-7-444 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 1983), petition for writ of mandamusfiled
sub nom. In re United States, No. 83-7-583 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 1983); Business
Roundtable Discussion, supra note 146, at 2603.
Under the Probation Act, restitution is imposed as an alternative sentence. 18
U.S.C. § 3651 (1982); Business Roundtable Discussion, supra note 146, at 2605. Most
defendants willingly consent to a sentence of restitution in order to avoid a prison
term. See Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side I of 5 (statement of Judge G. B.
Tjoflat, 11th Cir.). Courts have justified the lack of procedures afforded the defend-
ant on the grounds that a court must be given wide discretion in choosing conditions
of probation. In order to achieve offender rehabilitation, the Probation Act states
that probation may be "upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best." 18
U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). In interpreting the Probation Act, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the trial court has "an exceptional degree of flexibility in" setting
terms and conditions of probation. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932);
accord United States v. Baker, 429 F.2d 1344, 1347 (7th Cir. 1970); see Best &
Birzon, Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51 Geo. L.J. 809, 826 (1963); Harland
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in obtaining criminal convictions, this section will discuss the impact
of restitution on the plea bargaining process.
A. Right to a Jury under the VWPA
The civil elements of a restitution order raise the issue whether
restitution is subject to the seventh amendment thus requiring that the
defendant be given the right to a jury to compute the award.160 The
seventh amendment provides that "[iln Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right to trial
by jury shall be preserved .... "161 To fall within the scope of the
seventh amendment, a new cause of action must be comparable to a
historical common-law action. 162
In United States v. Welden, 163 the district court found that the
restitution provision of the VWPA creates an action at "common
law," thereby entitling the defendant to a jury trial pursuant to the
seventh amendment.164 The court reasoned that the right to a jury was
required because a restitution order has the same effect as a civil
judgment. 165 The court stated that it "cannot construe a hearing
which necessarily results in a civil judgment, . . . not to be a 'suit at
common law' within the contemplation of the Seventh Amend-
ment."' 166 The court relied upon the collateral estoppel 67 and enforce-
I, supra note 30, at 73-74, 126. Under the VWPA, the court has an obligation to
impose restitution as part of every criminal sentence involving property loss or
physical injury, Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 12; see 128 Cong. Rec.
S13,064 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Sen. Laxalt); Petition for Writ of
Mandamus, supra note 46, at 11, and must state its reasons for not doing so. 18
U.S.C. § 3579(a)(2) (1982).
160. United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516, 534 (N.D. Ala. 1983), appeal
docketed, No. 83-7-444 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 1983), petition for writ of mandamus filed
sub nom. In re United States, No. 83-7-583 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 1983); Teleconference
Tapes, supra note 1, side 1 of 5 (statement of Judge G. B. Tjoflat, 11th Cir.);
Bennett, supra note 20, at 4; see Rehabilitation of Victims, supra note 158, at 327
n.50.
161. U.S. Const. amend. VII.
162. 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2302, at 14-15
(1971); see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333 (1979); United States v.
Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516, 534 (N.D. Ala. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-7-444
(11th Cir. Aug. 8, 1983), petition for writ of mandamus filed sub nom. In re United
States, No. 83-7-583 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 1983).
163. 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983), appeal docketed, No.83-7-444 (11th. Cir.
Aug. 8, 1983), petition for writ of mandamus filed sub nom. In re United States, No.
83-7-583 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 1983).
164. Id. at 534.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. Although the court referred to "res judicata," see id., the VWPA contains
a collateral estoppel provision. There is a technical difference between res judicata
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ment provisions'68 of the Act to justify its conclusion. This section
examines these rationales in addition to other factors affecting the
nature of the restitution procedure.
1. Collateral Estoppel Provision
Section 3580(e) of the VWPA provides that "[a] conviction of a
defendant for an offense involving the act giving rise to restitution
under this section shall estop the defendant from denying the essential
allegations of that offense in any subsequent Federal civil proceeding
or State civil proceeding. . . brought by the victim."169 This provision
does not incorporate a new concept into federal law. Several circuit
courts have held that a defendant cannot relitigate the facts underly-
ing a criminal conviction in a subsequent civil proceeding.' 70 Addi-
tionally, the Supreme Court has stated that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel is "applicable to the decisions of criminal courts.' 7'
The Welden court's reliance on the Act's collateral estoppel provi-
sion to justify the need for a jury at a restitution hearing was mis-
placed. In its analysis of the provision the court reasoned that because
and collateral estoppel. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). Res judicata
means that a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes parties or those in
privity with them from relitigating the same cause of action and any claims or
defenses that were or might have been raised in a prior suit. Id.; see Cromwell v.
County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 4402, at 7 (1981) (quoting Kaspar Wire Works,
Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535-36 (5th Cir. 1978)). Collateral
estoppel, on the other hand, only precludes further litigation of those issues actually
determined in a prior suit and necessary to the earlier judgment. See Parklane
Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979). The term "res judicata" has tradition-
ally comprised both of these doctrines, 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra,
§ 4402, at 6-7, and the court in Welden apparently used the term in this broad sense.
In the legislative history of the Act, Congress similarly used the term "res judicata" to
refer to the collateral estoppel provision of the Act stating "that the underlying facts
of an adjudicated crime are to be treated as res judicata in a later civil proceeding."
Senate Report, supra note 1, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 2537. Thus, the Welden court's broad use of the term does not affect the analysis.
168. 568 F. Supp. at 534; see 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h) (1982).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(e) (1982). The collateral estoppel provision applies only to
the extent that it is consistent with the law in the state that the victim brings the
action. Id.
170. See Raiford v. Abney, 695 F.2d 521, 523 (11th Cir. 1983); Wolfson v. Baker,
623 F.2d 1074, 1078, 1080 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981); United
States v. Podell, 572 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1978); Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d
262, 264-65 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965). Several state statutes
that authorize the court to impose restitution in conjunction with other sentences
contain collateral estoppel provisions. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-18-75 (1982); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 895.05(8) (West 1982); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-37-17(2) (Supp. 1983).
171. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568 (1951)
(quoting Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 334 (1915)).
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the Act could estop a defendant from relitigating the facts underlying
a restitution order in a subsequent civil action brought by the victim,
a restitution hearing was an action at "common law.' ' 172 The court
failed to recognize however, that the defendant is estopped from
relitigating the facts underlying a restitution order only if these facts
were fully and fairly litigated at the criminal trial, or stipulated
through a guilty plea.17 3
The Act's provision merely obviates a victim's need to reestablish
the defendant's liability in a subsequent civil action. 17 4 If the victim's
level of injury was not part of the essential allegations underlying the
criminal conviction then the Act's collateral estoppel provision would
be inapplicable. 75 The collateral estoppel provision of the Act relates
to facts underlying the criminal conviction that are decided prior to a
sentencing court's restitution decision. 7 6 Thus, the collateral estoppel
provision of the VWPA does not turn the sentencing hearing into an
action at common law and is unrelated to the defendant's right to a
jury.
2. The Enforcement Provision
Section 3579(h) of the VWPA provides that "[a]n order of restitu-
tion may be enforced by the United States or a victim... in the same
manner as a judgment in a civil action.' 177 The Welden court did not
suggest how this provision transforms the criminal sentencing hearing
into an action at "common law," and there does not appear to be any
sound explanation. Section 3579(h) simply makes the procedures that
apply to collection of a civil judgment applicable to an order of
restitution. 78
172. See United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516, 534 (N.D. Ala. 1983), appeal
docketed, No. 83-7-444 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 1983), petitionfor writ of mandamus filed
sub nom. In re United States, No. 83-7-583 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 1983).
173. See Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 569 (1951);
Raiford v. Abney, 695 F.2d 521, 523 (11th Cir. 1983); Senate Report, supra note 1,
at 32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2538. A plea of nolo
contendere as compared to a guilty plea does not have a collateral estoppel effect.
Fed. R. Evid. 410(2); see Mickler v. Fahs, 243 F.2d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1957); A.B.
Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), appeal dismissed, 197 F.2d
498 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878 (1952).
174. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2538; see Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 9.
175. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(e) (1982).
176. See id.
177. Id. § 3579(h) (1982).
178. Petitition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 46, at 8; see Hill v. United
States ex rel. Wampler, 298 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1936); Senate Report, supra note 1, at
33, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2539.
[Vol. 52
RESTITUTION UNDER THE VWPA
Under the Probation Act, if a defendant fails to comply with a
restitution order the court can revoke probation. 179 Congress recog-
nized, however, that under the Probation Act courts have indiffer-
ently enforced restitution orders.180 To eliminate this problem, Con-
gress gave victims the right to enforce the restitution order in the same
manner as a civil judgment under the VW-PA.' 8' This type of provision
is not unprecedented. For example, section 3565 of title 18 of the
United States Code gives the government the right to collect a crimi-
nal penalty in the same manner as a civil judgment is collected.8 2 The
VWPA merely extends this right to crime victims. 8 3 Similarly, a
number of state statutes that authorize restitution in conjunction with
other sentences provide that the restitution order may be enforced by
the victim in the same manner as a civil judgment. 18 4 The inclusion of
this type of provision in the VWPA does not convert the restitutution
order into an action at common law. 181
3. Restitution-A Criminal Sentence
The seventh amendment only guarantees the right to a jury in
actions at common law. 186 The restitution provisions of the VWPA do
not create an action in any form. 18 7 The Act merely creates new rights
for crime victims by giving them the opportunity to receive limited
compensation through sentencing. 18 The characterization of a pen-
179. United States v. Steiner, 239 F.2d 660, 662 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
936 (1957); Gross v. United States, 228 F.2d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1956); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3651 (1982); see Unites States v. O'Quinn, 689 F.2d 1359, 1360-61 (11th Cir. 1982);
Schneider v. Housewright, 668 F.2d 366, 368-69 (8th Cir. 1981).
180. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2536.
181. Id. at 33, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2539.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 3565 (1982) states that a penalty imposed as a criminal sanction
may be collected "by execution against the property of the defendant in like manner
as judgments in civil cases." Id.
183. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 46, at 7.
184. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.089(6) (West Supp. 1983); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-14-
13 (1982); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-37-13 (1983); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:46-2b (West
1982); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-08 (1975); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-6 (Supp.
1983); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1270 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983) (restitution charge
shall constitute a lien).
185. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 46, at 7.
186. U.S. Const. amend VII.
187. See Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 4 of 5 (question and answer
session) (An "order of restitution is not an adjudication of victim's claims against the
offender. The victim always retains the right to institute a civil claim."); Justice
Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 26 (A "restitution order is imposed as part of a
sentencing hearing, not as an action for damages brought by the government against
an individual.").
188. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 31-32 (victim's right to compensation is
limited by the goals of defendant rehabilitation and the need to keep unencumbered
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alty as civil or criminal is a matter of legislative intent. 189 Although an
order of restitution achieves the civil goal of compensation, Congress
intended restitution to be a criminal sanction 9" rather than a form of
civil liability. 191 When Representative Rodino introduced the House
version of the VWPA, he stated that the Act "explicitly recognizes the
importance of restitution as a criminal sanction.' 1 92 Since the enact-
ment of the Probation Act, federal courts have viewed restitution as a
criminal sanction within the judge's sentencing power. 193 In addition,
virtually all state judges have either common-law or statutory author-
ity to impose restitution.194
the sentencing process), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2537-38;
128 Cong. Rec. H8207 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (statement of Rep. McCollum)
("The restitution provisions . . .contain a logical limitation on awarding restitu-
tion.").
189. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980); Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
190. See 128 Cong. Rec. H8467 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Rep.
McCollum) ("Restitution would become a sentence that could, in and of itself, be
imposed."); 128 Cong. Rec. S11,436 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1982) (statement of Sen.
Mathias) ("[This Act] [pjermit[s], for the first time, a Federal judge to order restitu-
tion as part of the sentence for crimes involving loss of property or personal injury.");
128 Cong. Rec. S3860 (daily ed. April 22, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Chiles) ("[lit
provides the remedy of restitution as a sentencing tool for judges .... ); 1981 Senate
Report, supra note 15, at 1001 (restitution is a penal sanction against offender); see
also State v. Lack, 98 N.M. 500, 508, 650 P.2d 22, 30 (1982) (restitution must be
considered part of sentencing process); Commonwealth v. Fuqua, 267 Pa. Super.
504, 509-10, 407 A.2d 24, 26-27 (1979) (restitution is a criminal sentence).
191. 128 Cong. Rec. H8467 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Rep. McCol-
lum); see Senate Report, supra note 1, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 2537. A number of state courts have held that restitution is not a form of
civil liability. State v. Garner, 115 Ariz. 579, 581, 566 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1977);
Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 755, 272 S.E.2d 709, 710 (1980); People v. Tidwell,
33 Ill. App. 3d 232, 237, 338 N.E.2d 113, 117 (1975); People v. Good, 287 Mich.
110, 115, 282 N.W. 920, 923 (1938); State v. Harris, 70 N.J. 586, 597-98, 362 A.2d
32, 38 (1976); State v. Lack, 98 N.M. 500, 508, 650 P.2d 22, 30 (1982); Feldman v.
Reeves, 45 A.D.2d 90, 92, 356 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (1st Dep't 1974); Commonwealth
v. Fuqua, 267 Pa. Super. 504, 507-08, 407 A.2d 24, 27 (1979); State v. Dillon, 637
P.2d 602, 606 (Oregon 1981); State v. Scherr, 9 Wis. 2d 418, 425, 101 N.W.2d 77, 81
(1960).
192. 128 Cong. Ree. H8205 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982).
193. See United States v. Boswell, 565 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 819 (1978); Senate Report, supra note 1, at 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 2536; Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 26; Petition for
Writ of Mandamus, supra note 46, at 6.
194. Omnibus Victims Protection Act: Hearings on S. 2420 Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Law of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1982)
(statement of Marlene A. Young, Executive Director of the National Organization for
Victim Assistance (NOVA)) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; New State Laws,
supra note 2, at 2. Numerous states have passed statutes giving the sentencing judge
the authority to order restitution as a criminal penalty in conjunction with other
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Further, the criminal nature of a restitution order distinguishes it
from an action at common law subject to the seventh amendment jury
requirement. At the sentencing hearing, the court imposes restitution
as part of the defendant's penalty. Once guilt has been established at a
trial in which a jury was available or through a plea, the defendant
does not have the right to demand a jury to determine the penalty. 195
The Welden court failed to recognize that the criminal aspects of a
restitution order distinguish it from a civil judgment. Before ordering
restitution, the court must consider the defendant's financial needs
and resources' 96 so that restitution will not interfere with rehabilita-
tion. 97 A defendant's lack of resources may prevent a judge from
ordering restitution even though the victim has proved his losses. 98 o
The Act also permits the court to order service restitution in lieu of
cash restitution,9 9 giving the judge flexibility to tailor a sentence with
the maximum rehabilitative effect. 200
forms of punishment. See Ala. Code § 15-18-67 (1980); Alaska Stat. § 12.55.015(a)(5)
(1980); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.089 (West Supp. 1983); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-14-3
(1982); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 706-605(1)(e) (1976 & Supp. 1982); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38,
§ 1005-5-3(b)5, 7 (Smith-Hurd 1982); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-5-3(a) (Burns Supp.
1983); Iowa Code Ann. § 910.2 (West Supp. 1983-1984); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-
A, § 1323 (1983); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 640(b) (Supp. 1982); Miss. Code Ann.
§ 99-37-3 (Supp. 1983); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-2 (West 1982); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-
17-1 (1981); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-57.1 (1983); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-02(1)(e)
(Supp. 1983); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.11(E) (Page 1983); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 137.106 (1981); Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1106(a) (Purdon Supp. 1983); R.I.
Gen. Laws § 12-19-32 (1981); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-23-210(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1982); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23A-28-1 (1979 & Supp. 1983); Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-201(3)(a) (Supp. 1983); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.94A.140(2) (Supp. 1983-
1984).
195. See Morgan v. Wainwright, 676 F.2d 476, 481 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 380 (1982); Clark v. Blackburn, 605 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1979); Turnbough
v. Wyrick, 551 F.2d 202, 203 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 941 (1977).
196. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a) (1982); Senate Report, supra note 1, at 32, reprinted in
1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2538; see 1981 Senate Report, supra note 15, at
999 (before ordering restitution court must "examine the overall financial implica-
tions to the defendant").
197. Restitution in an amount greater than the defendant's ability to pay will
undermine the defendant's rehabilitation by placing an overwhelming burden on
him, Harland I, supra note 30, at 92-93; see State v. Garner, 115 Ariz. 579, 581, 566
P.2d 1055, 1057 (1977); Commonwealth v. Fuqua, 267 Pa. Super. 504, 509, 407
A.2d 24, 26 (1979); Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 798-99, 266 N.W.2d 403, 407
(1978), and may even encourage the defendant to commit more crimes to meet his
obligation. See infra note 390 and accompanying text.
198. See Commonwealth v. Fuqua, 267 Pa. Super. 504, 508-09, 407 A.2d 24, 26
(1979); Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 803-04, 266 N.W.2d 403, 409 (1978);
Senate Report, supra note 1, at 32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 2538; N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 146, § 6.42, at 296.
199. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(4) (1982). See supra notes 77-93 and accompanying text.
200. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2538. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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The type and extent of losses recoverable through restitution are
also more limited than those generally recoverable in a civil action. 20'
For example, the Act precludes a victim from recovering speculative
damages, such as pain and suffering, 202 that may be recovered in a
tort action for personal injury. 20 3 Similarly, a victim is precluded from
recovering "loss of use" damages20 4 that may be recovered in an action
for property damage. 20 5 The Act also gives the court discretion not to
order restitution, an option that is clearly unavailable in an action at
common law, if doing so would unduly complicate or prolong the
sentencing process. 20 6
Moreover, because restitution is a criminal sentence, a judge must
balance a victim's need for compensation against the other goals of
sentencing2 7-rehabilitation, deterrence, retribution, and re-
straint.2 08 This balancing process requires the court to consider infor-
mation regarding the defendant's character, lifestyle, and prior crimi-
201. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Analytic Report No.
VAD-9, Restitution to Victims of Personal and Household Crimes 6 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Analytic Report]; Harland I, supra note 30, at 86.
202. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
203. D. Dobbs, supra note 76, § 8.1, at 545; W. Prosser, supra note 122, § 12, at
50; see Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 377 F. Supp. 136, 138-39 (E.D. La.
1974); Tucker v. Lower, 200 Kan. 1, 9, 434 P.2d 320, 327 (1967).
204. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(1) (1982).
205. D. Dobbs, supra note 76, § 5.11, at 383; see Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maats-
chaapi, N.V. (KLM Royal Dutch Airlines) v. United Technologies Corp., 610 F.2d
1052, 1056 (2d Cir. 1979); Snavely v. Lang, 592 F.2d 296, 299 (6th Cir. 1979).
206. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(d) (1982). Congress included this provision specifically to
prevent the sentencing hearing from becoming a substitute for a civil damages trial.
128 Cong. Rec. H8467 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Rep. McCollum); see
Senate Report, supra note 1, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 2537; Cong. Rec. H8205 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (statement of Sen. Rodino). As
a practical matter, requiring a jury trial at sentencing would be the end of the
restitution provisions of the Act. Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 2 of 5
(statement of L. Schwartz, Benjamin Franklin Professor of Law, Univ. of Pa.).
207. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 32 (congressional intent was "to provide the
court with some flexibility in determining the kind of restitution which would both
satisfy the victim and provide maximum rehabilitative incentives to the offender"),
reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2538; Teleconference Tapes,
supra note 1, side 1 of 5 (statement of L. Schwartz, Benjamin Franklin Prof. of Law,
Univ. of Pa.) (when ordering restitution court must take into account defendant's
resources and finances, victim's needs and needs of system); see Commonwealth v.
Fuqua, 267 Pa. Super. 504, 510, 407 A.2d 24, 27 (1979) (when ordering restitution,
court must consider "the type of payment ... that will best serve the needs of the
victim and the capabilities of the defendant"). See infra notes 389-92 and accompa-
nying text.
208. A. Campbell, Law of Sentencing § 4, at 21 (1978); N. Kittrie and E. Zenoff,
Sanctions, Sentencing and Corrections-Law, Policy and Practice 12-15 (1981).
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nal record2 9 that would be irrelevant, and often inadmissible,2 10 in a
"common law" action for damages.
Finally, restitution should be imposed by the judge rather than by
the jury, because juries do not have the expertise2 11 required to assess
the type or amount of restitution that would best meet the compensa-
tion needs of the victim, the correctional needs of the offender, and
the sentencing needs of society.212 A proper sentencing decision re-
quires the judge to have a thorough understanding of modern sentenc-
ing goals. 21 3 A juror cannot be expected to develop this level of under-
standing and competence for the infrequent occasions that he is called
upon to exercise his civic duty. 214 Thus, the decision to impose restitu-
tion should be made by the judge in his sentencing capacity. 215
209. C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 526, at 100-01 (2d
ed. 1982). See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
210. C. Wright, supra note 209, § 526, at 89-90; 3 ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice, Standard 18-1.1 commentary at 18.16 n.3 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
ABA Standards].
211. 4 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 625, at 257 (12th ed. 1976)
(main objection to jury sentencing is that jurors have no opportunity to develop
expertise); ABA Standards, supra note 210, Standard 18-1.1 commentary at 18.16
(sentencing decision requires expertise that jury does not possess); President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime
in a Free Society 145 (1967) (jury does not have expertise to assess correctional needs
of offenders) [hereinafter cited as Challenge of Crime]; Note, Jury Sentencing In
Virginia, 53 Va. L. Rev. 968, 1001 (1967) (jury sentencing is inadequate because
jurors "lack ... education in ... goals of modern sentencing") [hereinafter cited as
Jury Sentencing].
212. Cf. Challenge of Crime, supra note 211, at 141 ("A sentence prescribes
punishment, but it also should be the foundation of an attempt to rehabilitate the
offender, to insure that he does not endanger the community, and to deter others
from similar crimes in the future."). See supra note 207 and accompanying text, infra
389-91 and accompanying text.
213. See A. Campbell, supra note 208, § 93, at 299-300 ("Proper performance of
the judicial sentencing role is far from easy. Selecting the appropriate sentence often
requires detailed knowledge of the individual offender, of the range and probable
effect of various sentencing alternatives, and of complex substantive and procedural
sentencing rules."); cf. Jury Sentencing, supra note 211, at 1001 (jurors lack educa-
tion in goals of modern sentencing); see also Challenge of Crime, supra note 211, at
145 (Commission recommends programs to "educate judges in sentencing and correc-
tional methods.").
214. ABA Standards, supra note 210, Standard 18-1.1 commentary 18.16; see also
Challenge of Crime, supra note 211, at 141 ("There is no decision in the criminal
process that is as complicated and difficult as the one made by the sentencing
judge.").
215. See Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 755, 272 S.E.2d 709, 710 (1980); People v.
Gallagher, 55 Mich. App. 613, 620, 223 N.W.2d 92, 96 (1974); State v. Harris, 70
N.J. 586, 598, 362 A.2d 32, 37-38 (1976); State ex rel. D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 503, 361
A.2d 513, 521 (1976); State v. Lack, 98 N.M. 500, 506, 508, 650 P.2d 22, 28, 30
(1982); State v. Dillon, 637 P.2d 602, 607 & n.7 (Oregon 1981); Jacob, Reparation or
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Although a defendant does not have a right to a jury at sentencing,
the civil aspects of restitution require that a defendant be given more
procedural protection then that traditionally afforded at sentenc-
ing.2 16 The next section analyzes these traditional procedures and the
scope of additional procedures necessitated by the Act.
B. Due Process at Sentencing
While the defendant has important due process rights at sentenc-
ing,2 17 he need not be accorded the same degree of protection afforded
at the criminal trial.218 Trial-like procedures would impair the judge's
Restitution by the Criminal Offender to His Victim: An Applicability of an Ancient
Concept in the Modern Correctional Process, 61 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police
Sci. 152, 165-66 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Jacob II]; Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra
note 9, at 26. Contra United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516, 534 (N.D. Ala.
1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-7-444 (11th Cir. Aug 8, 1983), petition for writ of
mandamus filed sub nom. In re United States, No. 83-7-583 (11th Cir. Oct. 25,
1983); Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 1 of 5 (statement of Judge G. B.
Tjoflat, 11th Cir.); Bennett, supra note 20, at 4; see Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2352 (Supp.
1983) ("If a defendant pleads guilty ... the court ... determine[s] the amount of
restitution ... [i]f defendant is found guilty ... [by the] jury, the jury ... deter-
mine[s] the amount of restitution .... "); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.200 (Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1982) (if defendant consents to an amount of restitution that is liqui-
dated, court will order judgment accordingly; if defendant contests amount,
however, jury is impaneled to ascertain amount); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 546.640 (Vernon
1949) (same); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-116 (1982) (when defendant has been
convicted of stealing property, court will order restitution in an amount determined
by a jury).
216. See United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516, 534-35 (N.D. Ala. 1983),
appeal docketed, No. 83-7-444 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 1983), petition for writ of manda-
mus filed sub nom. In re United States, No. 83-7-583 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 1983);
Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 1 of 5 (statement of Judge G. B. Tjoflat,
11th Cir.); Altimari, supra note 20, at 19-20; cf. Rehabilitation of Victims, supra
note 158, at 327 (defendant should have same procedural safeguards as civil trial if
restitution becomes part of every sentence). But see Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra
note 9, at 22 (traditional sentencing procedures should be maintained).
217. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("[I]t is now
clear that the sentencing process ... must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process
Clause."); see Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386
U.S. 605, 610-11 (1967); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948); United
States v. Schell, 692 F.2d 672, 677-78 (10th Cir. 1982). In United States v. Fatico,
458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1073 (1980), the court recognized that sentencing is a critical stage of the
criminal process. For defendants, it is often the only critical stage because the vast
majority of convictions are obtained through guilty pleas. Id. at 396; House Report,
supra note 46, at 444 (1980) ("Since appproximately 90 percent of all Federal
convictions result from pleas of guilty, the most significant event in the Federal
criminal justice process, for ... the offender, usually is sentencing."); see Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) (because of gravity of penalty stage, defendant's
fundamental constitutional rights must be preserved).
218. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245-46 (1949); United States v.
Stephens, 699 F.2d 534, 537 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707,
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ability to individualize the sentence,2 1 9 which requires the consider-
ation of information unrelated to the defendant's guilt or innocence
that would be inadmissible at trial.2 0 The defendant's interests at
sentencing also must be balanced against the nature of the govern-
ment function.2 21 The government has an interest in maintaining an
711 (2d Cir.), on remand, 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980); United States v. Espinoza, 481
F.2d 553, 566 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 657-58 (2d
Cir. 1973); see ABA Standards, supra note 210, Standard 18-6.4 commentary at
18.449. Although the scope of the defendant's due process rights at sentencing have
not been clearly defined, see id. Standard 18-6.4 commentary at 18.452-.455; A.
Campbell, supra note 208, § 41, at 150-51; N. Kittrie & E. Zenoff, supra note 208, at
144, the trend is towards affording the defendant greater procedural safeguards.
Fatico, 441 F. Supp. at 1290 ("There has been a clear drift away from the absolute
no-due-process-at-sentence position .... "); ABA Standards, supra note 210, Stan-
dard 18-6.4 commentary at 18.453-.455; N. Kittrie & E. Zenoff, supra note 208, at
144; see United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S.
736, 741 (1948); United States v. Harris, 558 F.2d 366, 373-74 (7th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court has
accorded extensive procedural safeguards to parolees and probationers before parole
or probation is revoked. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973); Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972). Commentators have noted that "[s]ince the
defendant who has not yet been sentenced has all of the liberty interests but none of
the restrictions of the parolee or probationer, . . . the need for providing due process
safeguards appears even stronger." Fennell & Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An
Empirical and Legal Analysis of the Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal
Courts, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1615, 1639 (1980); accord Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 402;
Harkness, Due Process in Sentencing: A Right to Rebut the Presentence Report?, 2
Hastings Const. L.Q. 1065, 1089 (1975). Further, the ABA has noted that a higher
level of procedural protections is needed when the judge is required to make a finding
of fact at sentencing. ABA standards, supra note 210, Standard 18-6.4 commentary
at 18.450-.451.
219. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949); United States v. Harris, 558
F.2d 366, 372-73 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. McCoy, 517 F.2d 41, 44 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 895 (1975).
220. At sentencing, the court is expected to individualize the sentence to "[suit] the
defendant's character, social history, and potential for recidivism." Fennell & Hall,
supra note 218, at 1616 (footnote omitted); accord United States v. Grayson, 438
U.S. 41, 53 (1978) (sentencing decision requires consideration of defendant's person
and personality); United States v. Harris, 558 F.2d 366, 372 (7th Cir. 1977) ("In
determining an appropriate punishment, all the circumstances of the particular
crime and the background of the individual offender must be considered."). The
court is allowed to rely upon hearsay information. See Williams v. Oklahoma, 358
U.S. 576, 583-84 (1959); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1949); United
States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 712 (2d Cir. 1978) (court may rely on hearsay
information, but not on materially false information), on remand, 458 F. Supp. 388
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073
(1980); C. Wright, supra note 209, § 526, at 94 ("The only real limitation on the
information the judge may consider is that it is error if it can be shown that he relied
on information that was in fact not true.").
221. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972); State ex rel. D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 502-03, 361 A.2d 513, 521
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unencumbered sentencing process. 222 To afford the defendant a sec-
ond trial at sentencing would result in unreasonable delay and prohib-
itive cost to the government.22 3
In federal court, as long as the defendant is afforded notice and an
opportunity to be heard, as required by Rule 32 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, due process is satisfied. 224 Rule 32 requires the
Probation Department to "make a presentence investigation and re-
port to the court" prior to the sentencing hearing.22 In addition, the
court must disclose the report to the defendant and his counsel. 22 The
court also must afford the defendant, his counsel, and the prosecutor
the opportunity to make a statement at the sentencing hearing.227
Rule 32 contemplates an informal sentencing hearing. At the hear-
ing, the defendant does not usually have the right to call and cross-
examine witnesses to rebut information contained in the presentence
report. 228 The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that the de-
(1976); State v. Lack, 98 N.M. 500, 507, 650 P.2d 22, 29 (1982); see ABA Standards,
supra note 210, Standard 18-6.4 commentary at 18.449; Friendly, "Some Kind Of
Hearing," 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1278 (1975).
222. State ex rel. D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 503, 361 A.2d 513, 521 (1976); State v.
Lack, 98 N.M. 500, 507, 650 P.2d 22, 29 (1982); see 18 U.S.C. § 3579(d) (1982).
223. See ABA Standards, supra note 210, Standard 18-6.4 commentary at 18.451.
224. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 733, 763-64
(1980); see United States v. Behrens, 375 U.S. 162, 165 (1963) (opportunity for
defendant to make statement); United States v. Charmer Indus., Inc., 711 F.2d
1164, 1171 (2d Cir. 1983) (due process requires that upon request, defendant be
permitted to read presentence report); Fennell & Hall, supra note 218, at 1637 (right
to disclosure of presentence report).
225. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1).
226. Id. R. 32(a)(1)(A).
227. Rule 32(a)(1)(C) affords the defendant two rights at sentencing, the right "to
make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment." Id. R. 32(a)(1)(C). These rights are commonly referred to as the
defendant's right to "allocution." See C. Wright, supra note 209, § 525, at 82.
228. Rule 32(c)(3)(A) gives the defendant or his counsel the opportunity to com-
ment on and to correct any factual inaccuracies in the presentence report. C. Wright,
supra note 209, § 526, at 91. Although courts have held that the defendant must be
given the opportunity to rebut information contained in the report, United States v.
Aguero-Segovia, 622 F.2d 131, 132 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hodges, 556
F.2d. 366, 369 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016 (1978); United States v.
Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 119 & n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Shelton v. United States, 497 F.2d
156, 159 (5th Cir. 1974); Collins v. Buchkoe, 493 F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir. 1973); C. Wright, supra note
209, § 526, at 91, the defendant does not have a constitutional right to cross-examine
witnesses at the sentencing hearing, see Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250
(1949); A. Campbell, supra note 208, § 67, at 216; Schulhofer, supra note 224, at
760; see also United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 657-58 (2d Cir. 1973) (state-
ments in presentence report need not be "established or refuted by presentation of
evidence").
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fendant has the right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate informa-
tion. 229 Thus, a sentencing court has the discretion to conduct a more
formal hearing to settle disputes regarding the presentence report.2 30
Such a hearing may be appropriate when the court orders restitution
under the Act. 23'
Congress changed sentencing to include the goal of victim compen-
sation. 232 This goal differs substantially from the traditional sentenc-
ing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and restraint. 233
Due process is a pliable concept that bends to meet the needs of a
particular situation, 234 thus, when the sentencing situation includes
the goal of victim compensation different sentencing procedures may
be needed. 235 Before a defendant is ordered to make restitution, the
229. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 n.7 (1974); United States
v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-49 (1972); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41
(1948); United States v. LoRusso, 695 F.2d 45, 51 n.2 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 1525 (1983). Pursuant to a 1983 amendment, Rule 32 requires the court to
make a factual finding for the record if the defendant or his counsel challenge the
accuracy of the information contained in the presentence report. Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(c)(3)(D).
230. At the hearing, the defendant may have the right to dispute information
contained in the presentence report by "submit[ting] affidavits or documents, supply-
[ing] oral statements, or even participat[ing] in an evidentiary hearing." United
States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775, 779 (2d Cir. 1976) (footnotes omitted); see United
States v. Charmer Indus., 711 F.2d 1164, 1172 (2d Cir. 1983); Knight v. Johnson,
699 F.2d 162, 165 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 112 (1983); United States v.
Harris, 558 F.2d 366, 373-74 (7th Cir. 1977); Shelton v. United States, 497 F.2d 156,
159 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553, 557-58 (5th Cir. 1973).
In United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980), the court recognized that a
defendant being sentenced under a special-offender statute has the right to cross-
examine witnesses who supplied information for the presentence report. Id. at 398-
99. Some writers have stated that the defendant should always have the right to
cross-examine witnesses if he disputes information in the presentence report. Hark-
ness, supra note 218, at 1089; Note, Disclosure of Presentence Reports: A Constitu-
tional Right to Rebut Adverse Information By Cross-Examination, 3 Rut.-Cam. L.J.
111, 117 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Disclosure of Reports].
231. See infra notes 324-30 and accompanying text.
232. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 2536.
233. J. Hall, supra note 147, at 241; Harland I, supra note 30, at 119-20; W.
Prosser, supra note 122, § 2, at 7.
234. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961).
235. See Epstein, Crime and Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles, in Assessing the
Criminal: Restitution, Retribution, and the Legal Process 231, 255-56 (R. Barnett &
J. Hagel eds. 1977); Klein, Revitalizing Restitution: Flogging a Horse that May Have
Been Killed for Just Cause, 20 Crim. L.Q. 383, 390 (1978); Rehabilitation of Vic-
tims, supra note 158, at 327 & n.50.
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defendant must be given timely notice0 36 of the victim's claim and a
meaningful opportunity to challenge the facts supporting it, 237 the two
basic elements of due process. 238 This section discusses whether the
procedures established by Congress for ordering restitution afford the
defendant adequate due process. When the existing procedures do not
afford the defendant adequate due process, alternative procedures are
suggested.
1. Procedures for Ordering Restitution
Congress paid little attention to the procedural aspects of restitution
in enacting the VWPA.2 39 Neither the House nor the Senate discussed
how a sentence of restitution affects the due process rights of the
defendant. 240 The procedural provisions for ordering restitution were
added to the Act on the day Congress passed the legislation 241 and fail
to elaborate on the exact procedures that a court must follow.
The VWPA provides that before ordering restitution, the court
must consider the degree of harm suffered by the victim242 and the
financial needs and resources of the defendant and the defendant's
dependents. 243 The prosecutor must prove the victim's losses.244 The
defendant must prove his financial needs and resources. 4 5 The court
236. See infra notes 275-83 and accompanying text.
237. See infra notes 297-330 and accompanying text.
238. One element of due process is notice. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579
(1975); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337, 342 (1969); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950). The other element of due process is opportunity to be heard. Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
239. See United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516, 527-30 (N.D. Ala. 1983),
appeal docketed, No. 83-7-444 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 1983), petition for writ of manda-
mus filed sub nom. In re United States, No. 83-7-583 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 1983).
240. Id.
241. On September 30, 1982, Representative Rodino introduced the House version
of the VWPA, H.R. 7191 (Comprehensive Victim and Witness Protection and Assist-
ance Act of 1982), 128 Cong. Rec. H8201 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982). Mr. Rodino's
legislation contained § 3580, Procedure for Issuance Order of Restitution. Id. at
H8206. On September 30, 1982, the House passed H.R. 7191, and then took up
consideration of S. 2420, the Senate version of the VWPA. Id. at H8212. The House
voted to strike all portions of S. 2420 after the enacting clause and to substitute the
provisions of H.R. 7191. Id. at 8215. On October 1, 1982, the House and Senate
passed the amended version of the Act. 128 Cong. Rec. H8464-70 (daily ed. Oct. 1,
1982); 128 Cong. Rec. S13056-64 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982). There was no debate in
either the House or the Senate concerning the added procedures.
242. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a) (1982).
243. Id.
244. Id. § 3580(d).
245. Id.
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receives this information through a report2 46 prepared by the Proba-
tion Department. 247 This report must be disclosed to the defendant
and the prosecutor. 24 Additionally, the Act provides that disputes
concerning restitution are to be resolved by the court using a "prepon-
derance of the evidence standard. '249
These procedures leave a number of questions unanswered. It is
unclear whether the information in the presentence report must be
verified. The Act does not require verified information, but the legis-
lative history contains references to the need for verified informa-
tion.250 Additionally, the Act does not specify when the restitution
246. The information may be provided in the presentence report or in a separate
restitution report. Id. § 3580(b). Section 3 of the VWPA amends paragraph 2 of Rule
32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as follows:
(2) Report-The presentence report shall contain:
(C) information concerning any harm, including financial, social, psy-
chological, and physical harm, done to or loss suffered by any victim of the
offense; and
(D) any other information that may aid the court in sentencing, includ-
ing the restitution needs of any victim of the offense.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(2)(C), (D). These provisions were intended to encourage and
aid the court when ordering restitution. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 13,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2519; 128 Cong. Rec. H8202
(daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (statement of Rep. Rodino). The Department of Justice
states that the victim impact statement "will be used to determine the amount of
restitution." Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 5; see Altimari, supra note 20,
at 4. For the purposes of this Project, the information relied upon by a court when
ordering restitution, whether contained in a presentence report or in a separate
report, will be referred to as a "restitution report."
247. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(b) (1982).
248. Id. § 3580(c).
249. Id. § 3580(d).
250. The Senate version of the Act contained an amendment to Rule 32 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that would have required every presentence
report to contain a" 'victim impact statement' which consists of verified information
assessing the financial, social, psychological, and medical impact upon the victim of
the crime." Senate Report, supra note 1, at 13, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 2519; see 128 Cong. Rec. S11436 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1982) (statement of
Sen. Mathias); 128 Cong. Rec. S3859 (daily ed. April 22, 1982) (statement of Sen.
Laxalt). During the hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the need
for verified information in the victim impact statement was stressed. Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 194, at 147 (statement of Paul R. Falconer, Chief U.S. Probation
Officer, D. Md.) ("It is essential that a victim impact statement be factual and
confirmed . . .[w]e never want to be guilty of waving the bloody shirt; neither are
we to bury the bloody shirt with the victim still in it."). The House version of the Act
omitted the verification requirement. 128 Cong. Rec. H8202-07 (daily ed. Sept. 30,
1982) (section-by-section analysis of legislation). The Act passed without the verifica-
tion requirement on October 1, 1982. Cong. Rec. S13,056-64 (daily ed. Oct. 1,
1982); 128 Cong. Rec. H8468-70 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982). Notwithstanding the
absence of the verification requirement, one probation officer has noted that proba-
tion departments are responsible for verifying the information in the presentence
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report should be disclosed. 25' Further, there is no indication of the
scope of the defendant's right to disclosure. Specifically, the effect of
the Act on the nondisclosure provisions of Rule 32(c) (3) (A) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is not delineated. 2, 2 Moreover,
the Act does not specify a forum for resolving disputes concerning
restitution, and it is unclear whether disputes are to be resolved at the
sentencing hearing or a separate proceeding.253 Finally, the Act does
not indicate what procedural protections, such as the rules of evidence
and the opportunity to confront witnesses,2 54 are to be afforded the
defendant at this proceeding. These questions implicate the defend-
ant's right to due process2 55 because the procedures established by the
Act do not assure that the defendant will receive meaningful prior
notice 2 56 of a victim's alleged loss or a meaningful opportunity to
contest that claim .257
2. Adequate Notice
Under the VWPA, the defendant receives notice of the victim's
restitution claim through the restitution report. 25 The report provides
meaningful prior notice only if the information contained in the re-
port is reliable2 59 and the defendant receives the report sufficiently in
advance of the hearing to prepare his case. 260 Because the VWPA does
report unless the record is clear and there is no dispute. Teleconference Tapes, supra
note 1, side 2 of 5 (statement of D. Chamlee, Deputy Chief Probation Division,
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts). The legislative history does not define the
term "verified." For the purposes of this Project, information is considered verified if
it is presented in the form of affidavits, see State ex rel. D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 504,
361 A.2d 513, 522 (1976); Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 22, or if the
information has been independently investigated, Teleconference Tapes, supra note
1, side 2 of 5 (statement of D. Chamlee, Deputy Chief Probation Division, Adminis-
trative Office of the U.S. Courts).
251. See infra notes 275-83 and accompanying text.
252. See infra notes 284-92 and accompanying text.
253. See infra notes 293-96 and accompanying text.
254. See infra notes 308-11 and accompanying text.
255. United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516, 534-35 (N.D. Ala. 1983), appeal
docketed, No. 83-7-444 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 1983), petition for writ of mandamus filed
sub nom. In re United States No. 83-7-583 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 1983); see Altimari,
supra note 20, at 19-20; Bennett, supra note 20, at 4-5.
256. See infra notes 258-90 and accompanying text.
257. See infra notes 297-311 and accompanying text.
258. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(c) (1982). See supra note 248.
259. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 n.7 (1974); United States
v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 133 (1967);
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948); United States v. Fatico, 458 F.
Supp. 388, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1073 (1980); Harkness, supra note 218, at 1070-71.
260. United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 1976) ("To enable a
defendant to effectively present his version of the facts ... a defendant must be given
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not require verified information in the report, there is a potential for
unreliabilty. 26 ' In addition, the Act's failure to address the timing of
disclosure affects the defendant's opportunity to rebut adequately the
statements in the report.2 62
a. Verified Information in the Presentence Report
A recent study of the use of presentence reports in federal district
courts found that "[t]he principal problem inherent in the use of the
presentence report is its potential for introducing inaccurate or mis-
leading information.12 3 This problem may be particularly acute un-
der the VWPA. When a victim is not required to verify his losses to
receive compensation, he may be tempted to inflate his claim.2 64 The
VWPA's failure to require verified information may result in the court
ordering the defendant to pay an amount in excess of the victim's
losses. 265 In addition, if the defendant's financial resources are not
verified, his liability may exceed his ability to pay.2 66
adequate time to prepare and present a rebuttal to information which he contests.");
see Fennell & Hall, supra note 218, at 1644 (defendant must be given adequate time
to decide whether to challenge report's contents).
261. Cf. N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 146, § 6.42 (presentence report may
contain little reliable information on which to base restitution). See infra notes 263-
64 and accompanying text.
262. See infra notes 275-83 and accompanying text.
263. Fennell & Hall, supra note 218, at 1628; see N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra
note 146, § 6.42; National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards &
Goals: Corrections standard 5.17 comment at 191 (1973).
264. N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 146, § 6.42, at 296 n.448; Altimari, supra
note 20, at 5; see Business Roundtable Discussion, supra note 146, at 2603 ("[Restitu-
tion] could encourage the unscrupulous to lodge false criminal charges in order to
benefit financially from another's criminal trial .. "); see also Geis, Restitution by
Criminal Offenders: A Summary and Overview, in Restitution in Criminal Justice
147, 153 (J. Hudson & B. Galaway eds. 1977) ("[V]ictims may inflate their claims
against offenders, just as they do against insurance companies .. "). One study of
restitution programs revealed that program directors, criminal offenders, and the
parents of juvenile offenders are concerned that victims may inflate their claims.
Hudson, Galaway & Chesney, When Criminals Repay Their Victims: A Survey of
Restitution Programs, 60 Judicature 313, 316 (1977).
265. See State v. Ivie, 38 Or. App. 453, 455, 590 P.2d 740, 740 (1979). In Ivie, the
court upheld a sentence that included a restitution order of $338 and a five-year term
of imprisonment even though the victim's claim that the defendant stole a jar of
pennies worth $15 and five record albums worth $75 was never verified and the
defendant contested the amount. In pronouncing sentence, the trial court conceded
that the victim's claim may have been somewhat inflated. Id. at 455, 590 P.2d at
740-41 (quoting trial court).
266. In United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983), appeal
docketed, No. 83-7-444 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 1983), petitionfor writ of mandamus filed
sub nom. In re United States, No. 83-7-583 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 1983), the presentence
report stated that one of the defendants had no assets, id. at 526, yet at the sentencing
hearing, the defendant's counsel stated that the defendant owned a statutory right to
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An unverified restitution report may also unnecessarily limit the
victim's recovery. If the report understates either the victim's harm or
the defendant's financial resources, the victim may be undercompen-
sated. In United States v. Welden, 2 67 the victim was kidnapped at
gunpoint and brutally assualted.2 68 The restitution report listed the
victim's medical expenses, but no attempt was made by the Probation
Department to verify this information26 9 or to investigate whether the
victim suffered other recoverable losses.2 70
To avoid the problems inherent in unverified reports, Congress
should amend the Act to require verification of information on mat-
ters relating to restitution. 271 The victim should document his claimed
loss,2 72 and the defendant should be required to submit a financial
statement and an affidavit from his employer stating his potential
redeem some of his property from a foreclosure sale. Id. Faced with such contradic-
tory evidence, it was impossible for the court to determine the "true financial
condition of [the] defendant." Id. Because the VWPA requires the court to consider
the defendant's finances before ordering restitution, 18 U.S.C. § 3580 (1982), it is
vitally important that this information accurately reflect the defendant's ability to
make restitution.
267. United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983), appeal dock-
eted, No. 83-7-444 (l1th Cir. Aug. 8, 1983), petition for writ of mandamus filed sub
nom. In re United States, No. 83-7-583 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 1983).
268. Id. at 525.
269. Id. The amount of the victim's medical bill was based on the Probation
Officer's third-hand references. Id. at 535. The report did not indicate whether the
bills had been paid by the victim or her insurance company. Id. at 525.
270. The Probation Department did not investigate whether the victim lost in-
come as a result of the crime or needed psychological counseling. Id. Both types of
losses are recoverable under the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3579 (b)(2)(A), (C) (1982).
271. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983), would amend Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to
require verified information on matters relating to restitution. 1983 Senate Report,
supra note 133, at 535; see ABA Standards, supra note 210, Standard 18-5.1(c) ("All
material information in the presentence report should be factual and verified. ... );
Model Sentencing and Corrections Act § 3-601(b) (1979) (if restitution is considered,
presentence report must contain documentation regarding the nature and amount of
victim's loss); National Advisory Commission on Criminal Standards and Goals
standard 5.14(7) (1973), reprinted in Compendium of Model Correctional Legisla-
tion and Standards VIII-71 (2d ed. 1975) ("All information in the presentence report
should be factual and verified .... ").
272. If the victim is claiming medical losses he should be required to submit an
affidavit from his doctor, hospital or clinic documenting those losses. See Justice
Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 22. Similar documentation should be required for
claims related to the cost of funeral expenses, which are recoverable under the Act.
18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(3) (1982). If the victim claims property loss, affidavits should be
required documenting the cost of repair or replacement or describing the basis of the
value claimed. See State ex rel. D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 504, 361 A.2d 513, 521-22
(1976); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4106(a) (Supp. 1982); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-35
(1981); N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 146, § 6.42, at 296.
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income. 273 If this information is disputed, the defendant and the
prosecutor should be given the right to cross-examine persons who
supplied information for the report and to present evidence to the
contrary.2 74
b. Timing of Notice
To provide meaningful prior notice of the victim's claim, the report
must be disclosed well in advance of the sentencing hearing.2 75 The
right to disclosure is worthless unless the defendant has an adequate
opportunity to assess276 and challenge2 77 the accuracy of the report and
to gather resources to support a defense at sentencing.2 78
A survey of ninety federal district courts found that "[o]nly 13
districts disclose the presentence report to both defendant and counsel
prior to the day of sentencing in 90 % or more of the cases. 2 79 In
response to this problem, courts must now disclose the presentence
report to the defendant a reasonable time prior to sentencing.2 80 This
response is inadequate, however, because reasonableness is a matter
273. Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 22. The defendant should also be
required to submit an affidavit from his dependents describing their financial needs.
Id. Finally, if the defendant owns property, an affidavit should be submitted esti-
mating its value. See United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516, 526 (N.D. Ala.
1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-7-444 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 1983), petition for writ of
mandamus filed sub nom. In re United States, No. 83-7-583 (11th Cir. Oct. 25,
1983).
274. United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775, 779 (2d Cir. 1976); see United States v.
Harris, 558 F.2d 366, 374 (7th Cir. 1977); 1983 Senate Report, supra note 133, at
472. See infra notes 324-25 and accompanying text.
275. United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 1976); see Miller v. State,
407 So. 2d 959, 960 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); State ex rel. D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488,
505, 361 A.2d 513, 522 (1976); State v. Lack, 98 N.M. 500, 507-08, 650 P.2d 22, 29-
30 (1982). See infra note 281.
276. 1983 Senate Report, supra note 133, at 74; see United States v. Robin, 545
F.2d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 1976); Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 32(c)(3)(A), (B), (C) advisory
committee note; ABA Standards, supra note 210, Standard 18-5.5 commentary at
18.379; Fennell & Hall, supra note 218, at 1643; Harkness, supra note 218, at 1071.
277. See United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 1976); 1983 Senate
Report, supra note 133, at 81; ABA Sentencing Standards, supra note 210, standard
18-5.5(a)(6) commentary at 18.379-.380; Fennell & Hall, supra note 218, at 1644.
278. United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 1976); see Goodson v.
State, 400 So. 2d 791, 793 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); 1983 Senate Report, supra note
133, at 81.
279. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(A), (B), (C) advisory committee note (citing Fen-
nell & Hall, supra note 218, at 1640-49). The survey further found that "[i]n 14
districts, disclosure is made only on request, and such requests are received in fewer
than 50 % of the cases .... [I]n 18 districts, a majority of the judges do not provide
any notice of the availability of the report, and in 20 districts such notice is given only
on the day of sentencing." Id.
280. Id. R. 32(c)(3)(A) and advisory committee note.
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within judicial discretion and the defendant may still not be afforded
an adequate opportunity to investigate or challenge claims presented
to him for the first time in the report.
To ensure that the defendant receives timely notice, Congress
should require disclosure of the report at least ten days before the
sentencing hearing.2 81 Early disclosure provides both the defendant
and the government with an opportunity to correct any inaccura-
cies28 2 in the report and to gather information to support their respec-
tive positions at the hearing.28 3
c. Scope of Disclosure of the Presentence Report
The VWPA also fails to define the scope of the defendant's right to
notice. The statute requires disclosure of all portions of the report to
the defendant and prosecutor. 28 4 The Act, however, does not specify
how this provision relates to Rule 32(c)(3)(A) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure,2 8 5 which allows the court to withhold informa-
tion obtained under a promise of confidentiality "which, if disclosed,
might result in harm ... to the defendant or other persons. '286
281. See 1983 Senate Report, supra note 133, at 471 (presentence reports must be
disclosed ten days prior to sentencing). The Comprehensive Crime Control Act, S.
1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), would also contain a provision requiring the court
to give the defendant and the government notice that it is considering the imposition
of restitution prior to the sentencing hearing. Id. at 472. The notification is intended
"to enable the parties to prepare adequately for the sentencing hearing." Id. at 81.
Chief Judge Moye of the Northern District of Georgia established procedures to
implement the VWPA in his court. These procedures require the United States
Attorney to "file with the court and serve upon the defendant a notice which shall
name each claimed victim of the offense, and shall detail the types of injuries
sustained by each victim, and shall show the monetary damages as to each injury."
Order to Facilitate Implementation of VWPA at 1 (N.D. Ga. June 27, 1983) (Moye,
C.J.). If the case is disposed of by plea, the prosecutor must file the notice prior to the
plea; if the case is disposed of by trial, he must file the notice at least two weeks prior
to the date set for sentencing. Id.; Order to Facilitate Implementation of VWPA at 1
(N.D. Ga. June 17, 1983) (O'Kelley, J.) (same); see ABA Standards, supra note 210,
Standard 18-5.5 commentary at 18.379 (presentence report should be disclosed suffi-
ciently prior to the imposition of sentence to afford a reasonable opportunity for
verification).
282. See supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 278.
284. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(c) (1982).
285. See Altimari, supra note 20, at 4.
286. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(A). When the Rule 32 exception applies to infor-
mation contained in the report, the court must give either an oral or written sum-
mary of the confidential information on which it relied. Id. R. 32(c)(3)(B). For an
excellent analysis of the confidentiality exception of Rule 32 see Fennell & Hall, supra
note 218, at 1651-66.
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Victims are often hesitant to supply information for presentence
reports unless the court promises confidentiality. 287 It is unclear
whether a court could give such a promise under the VWPA.28 8 If a
court promises confidentiality to the victim, the defendant will not
receive full disclosure of the basis for the victim's restitution claim. 289
Notice is meaningful only if it is complete.2 90
The legislative history of the VWPA indicates that Congress did not
intend Rule 32(c) (3) (A) to apply to portions of the presentence report
related to restitution.29 1 To ensure uniform interpretation by the dis-
trict courts, the VWPA should be amended to state that the nondisclo-
sure privilege of Rule 32(c)(3)(A) does not apply to portions of the
287. See Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 3 of 5 (statement of Judge J.
Miller, Jr., D. Md.). A victim may hesitate to give information for fear of retaliation
from the defendant. The federal District Court of Maryland had used victim impact
statements prior to the enactment of the VWPA and has developed a practice of
assuring victims who were hesitant to supply information for the report that the
information would be kept confidential. Id.
288. It has been noted that this practice could not be continued under the VWPA
because of its disclosure provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 3580(c) (1982). Teleconference
Tapes, supra note 1, side 3 of 5 (statement of Judge J. Miller, Jr., D. Md.).
289. A defendant would only receive a summary of the information relied upon by
the court in reaching its decision. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(B). There is a "serious
problem in the summarization practices of federal judges." Fennell & Hall, supra
note 218, at 1663. Only a minority of judges attempt to satisfy the summarization
requirement. Id. (Only 11.8% of the judges in ninety districts surveyed provide the
defendant with an oral or written summary, and less than 5 % provide a summary as
a standard practice.).
290. Even if the defendant is provided with a summary of the information, the
summary "may fail to furnish the defense with adequate factual information to
permit commentary and challenge." Fennell & Hall, supra note 218, at 1663.
291. In analyzing the disclosure provision of the VWPA, 18 U.S.C. § 3580(c)
(1982), Representative Rodino stated:
In order to have a fair procedure for determining whether to order restitu-
tion (and the amount of such restitution), both the attorney for the Govern-
ment and the defendant should have full access to information in the
presentence report (and in separate reports) about the factors described in
section 3580(a). Thus, the Committee has provided in section 3580(c) for
full disclosure to that information, and the provisions [of] Rule 32(c)(3) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure will not apply to that information
when that information is included in a presentence report.
128 Cong. Rec. H8207 n.21 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (statement of Rep. Rodino); see
Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 3 of 5 (statement of Judge J. Miller, Jr., D.
Md.). This interpretation is also consistent with the rule of statutory construction
that "a more specific statute will be given precedence over a more general one,
regardless of their temporal sequence." Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406
(1980); 2A C. Sands, supra note 49, § 51.05, at 315; see Hill v. Morgan Power
Apparatus Corp., 259 F. Supp. 609, 611 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 368 F.2d 230 (8th Cir.
1966). The VWPA is a more specific statute than Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure because the VWPA deals specifically with restitution reports. See
18 U.S.C. § 3580(c) (1982).
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presentence report concerning restitution. 22 Restitution is primarily
for the victim's benefit. A victim who is unwilling to supply informa-
tion for the report should be required to bring a civil action in order to
receive compensation from the defendant. If a victim wishes to re-
cover for his losses in a civil action, he will not be able to withhold
necessary information.
Unless the VWPA is amended to eliminate these problems, it is
unlikely that the defendant will receive meaningful prior notice of the
victim's restitution claim. Under the present statute, a defendant's
notice may be unreliable, poorly timed and incomplete; these defi-
ciencies must be corrected.
3. The Defendant's Opportunity to Be Heard
Congress intended restitution to become an integral part of sentenc-
ing without encumbering it.2 93 The legislative history of the Act indi-
cates that Congress intended courts to avoid trial-like procedures
when ordering restitution.2 4 The Department of Justice supports this
position and recommends that present pre-trial and sentencing proce-
dures be maintained.2 9 5 The Justice Department has stated that the
defendant's opportunity to be heard on questions relating to restitu-
tion should not be extended beyond the defendant's right to allocution
under Rule 32.296
The practicalities of criminal sentencing, however, suggest that the
informal procedures outlined by Rule 32 and the VWPA may not
provide the defendant with a meaningful opportunity to challenge a
victim's restitution claim. 297 Commentators have noted that sentenc-
ing often takes place "within a compressed time frame that precludes
reflective deliberation."2' 8 Further, a judge has usually reached a
292. See 128 Cong. Rec. H8207 n.21 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (statement of Rep.
Rodino). Commentators who have studied the disclosure provision of Rule 32, Fed.
R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3), favor full disclosure. ABA Standards, supra note 210, Standard
18-5.4 commentary at 18.365; Harkness, supra note 218, at 1067.
293. The court can order restitution only to the extent that it "will not unduly
complicate or prolong the sentencing process." 18 U.S.C. § 3579(d) (1982). See supra
note 15.
294. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 2537.
295. Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3, 22.
296. Id. at 4. For a description of the defendant's right to allocution under Rule
32, see supra note 227.
297. The Supreme Court has stated that "[a] fundamental requirement of due
process is 'the opportunity to be heard.' It is an opportunity which must be granted in
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 552 (1965) (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)); see Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
298. ABA Standards, supra note 210, Standard 18-5.5 at 18.382; see M. Frankel,
Criminal Sentences 36-37 (1973); Address by Federal District Court Judge Gerhard
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tentative decision on the sentence prior to the informal hearing. 99
This raises the problem that an informal decision regarding restitution
may be made before the defendant has had the opportunity to chal-
lenge the validity of the victim's claim. 300
Unlike other types of sentences, restitution requires the court to
decide issues of quantum that are usually decided at a civil trial. 30 1
Because a victim's loss need not be proved to obtain a conviction, it is
rarely determined by a jury verdict or a guilty plea. 302 Consequently,
the court may be faced with this issue for the first time at the sentenc-
ing hearing. 30 3 This is especially true if the restitution order includes
losses caused by acts that are not a part of the convicted offense. 30 4
The defendant must be given a meaningful opportunity to present his
Gessell, D.C. Cir., Judicial Sentencing Institute, November 22, 1968, quoted in
Miller, The Lawyer's Hang-Up: Due Process Versus the Real Issue, 11 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 197, 210 n.50 (1972).
299. M. Frankel, supra note 298, at 36-37. The ABA states that "counsel often
does little more than 'go through the motions' in making an allocution presentation
. . . , more important, that counsel's presentation is often a token effort made after a
de facto decision has already been reached." ABA Standards, supra note 210, Stan-
dard 18-5.5 commentary at 18.383; see Fennell & Hall, supra note 218, at 1679
(presentence conference helps to assure defense of "a substantive rather than ceremo-
nial role in the sentencing decision").
300. It is important that the defendant be given the opportunity to address the
court regarding the basis of the victim's claim, see State'x rel. D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488,
501-03, 361 A.2d 513, 520-21 (1976), whether the victim's expenses were necessary,
see Bennett, supra note 20, at 3, and whether the amount of restitution is fair in view
of defendant's financial resources, see Senate Report, supra note 1, at 32, reprinted in
1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2538 ("IT]he offender's ability to pay will be a
factor in the restitution order .. "). Additionally, if there are multiple defendants,
the defendant should be given the opportunity to discuss how his obligation will be
determined. See State ex rel. D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 503, 361 A.2d 513, 521 (1976).
301. Under the Act, the victim is able to recover damages usually only recoverable
in a tort action. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. For example, the
victim is able to recover the value of property that cannot be returned, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3579(b)(1)(B) (1982), and the amount of medical costs, id. § 3579(2)(A).
302. Business Roundtable Discussion, supra note 146, at 2604; see Patterson v.
State, 161 Ga. App. 85, 86, 289 S.E.2d 270, 272 (1982); N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra
note 146, § 6.40, at 293; Harland I, supra note 30, at 98-99; Justice Dep't Guidelines,
supra note 9, at 16; see also People v. Heil, 79 Mich. App. 739, 748, 262 N.W.2d 895,
900 (1977) ("Criminal and civil liability are not synonymous. A criminal conviction
does not necessarily establish the existence of civil liability.").
303. See Patterson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 85, 86, 289 S.E.2d 270, 272 (1982) (at
restitution hearing court will consider factors not relevant to or addressed during
adjudicatory phase).
304. See State v. Zimmerman, 37 Or. App. 163, 166, 586 P.2d 377, 379 (1978)
(restitution order included victims of other offenses that were dropped from the
indictment during plea bargaining and for which the defendant was never con-
victed). This possibility may result if "offense" is broadly defined to include the entire
criminal transaction. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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version of the facts before the court reaches a decision regarding his
obligations.30 5
The sentencing hearing may also be inherently too coercive to
provide the defendant with a meaningful opportunity to be heard on
the issues related to restitution. 306 The fear of a harsher sentence may
well inhibit the defendant from challenging a restitution order at the
hearing. 307 This may be especially true under the VWPA when the
305. See Maples v. State, 397 So. 2d 1146, 1147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Latti
v. State, 364 So. 2d 828, 830 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Cannon v. State, 246 Ga.
754, 756, 272 S.E.2d 709, 710 (1980); Patterson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 85, 86, 289
S.E.2d 270, 272 (1982); State ex rel. D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 505-06, 361 A.2d 513, 522
(1976); State v. Lack, 98 N.M. 500, 507-08, 650 P.2d 22, 29-30 (1982); State v.
Bergeron, 326 N.W.2d 684, 687 (N.D. 1982); State v. Dillon, 637 P.2d 602, 606 (Or.
1981); State v. Stalheim, 275 Or. 683, 688, 552 P.2d 829, 832 (1976). Additionally, a
number of state statutes that authorize the court to order restitution in conjunction
with other types of sentences provide that the defendant has the right to a hearing to
settle issues concerning restitution. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-18-67 (1982); Hawaii
Rev. Stat. § 706-604 (1976); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, §§ 640(b), 641(a) (Supp. 1983);
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-37-3(3) (Supp. 1983); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-57.1(d) (1983);
N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-08(1) (1976); Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.106(3) (1981); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-201(3)(c) (Supp. 1983); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-803(B)
(Supp. 1983) (court has authority to conduct hearing if it does not have sufficient
evidence to determine amount of restitution); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C3:43-3(e) (1982) (if
record does not contain sufficient evidence, court must hold hearing to determine
amount of restitution); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.20.030 (Supp. 1983) (if record does
not contain sufficient evidence, court may conduct full hearing); Wis. Stat. Ann. §
973.09(b) (Supp. 1983) (upon application of interested party, court will hold eviden-
tiary hearing to determine value of victim's loss).
306. Professor Harland has advocated a bifurcated sentencing process to provide
the defendant with a meaningful opportunity to be heard on restitution. The first
part of the process would "determine the type of sentence (incarceration versus a
community disposition such as probation), and the second [would] assess conditions
of that sentence, such as restitution." Harland I, supra note 30, at 105-06 (footnotes
omitted).
307. State v. Stalheim, 275 Or. 683, 687, 552 P.2d 829, 831 (1976); see State v.
Harris, 70 N.J. 586, 595-96, 362 A.2d 32, 36-37 (1976) (faced with possibility of jail,
defendant threw herself on mercy of court rather than challenge clearly excessive
restitution); State v. Sullivan, 24 Or. App. 99, 105-06, 544 P.2d 616, 619-20 (1976)
(Schwab, C.J., dissenting) (fact that defendant has choice is unpersuasive); State v.
Barnett, 110 Vt. 221, 236, 3 A.2d 521, 527 (1939) (Sherburne, J., dissenting) (threat
of imprisonment forces a settlement); N. Cohen & J. Gobert, supra note 146, § 6.42,
at 296 (in his desire for release defendant may hastily agree to pay a large sum of
money in too short a time). The court in Stalheim stated:
[W]hen faced with the alternative of paying what he might regard as an
exorbitant measure of damages or of going to prison, the defendant might
hesitate to argue with an award of restitution or reparation no matter how
speculative or unfair it might be or however summary the procedure under
which it was imposed.
275 Or. 683, 687, 552 P.2d 829, 831 (1976). This concern is not totally unfounded. In
State v. Ivie, 38 Or. App. 453, 590 P.2d 740 (1979), the Oregon Court of Appeals
upheld a $338 restitution award in conjunction with a five-year term of imprison-
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defendant can be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in addition to
making restitution.
Traditional sentencing procedures also restrict the manner in which
a defendant can dispute a victim's claim °.3 0 For example, the defend-
ant usually does not have the right to call witnesses at a sentencing
hearing even though such witnesses might dispute the victim's
claim.30 9 The defendant may need this right under the VWPA because
the court may order restitution based upon evidence that would be
inadmissible at a civil trial. 310 It may be impossible for the defendant
to ascertain the reliability of this information without confronting
witnesses. 311
To ensure that the defendant is provided with a meaningful oppor-
tunity to be heard on the determination of restitution, the VWPA
should require the court to hold a presentence conference before
ordering restitution.3 1 2 This will afford the defendant the chance to
ment. The trial court, in pronouncing sentence, stated that the defendant is "in no
situation, if [he] steal[s] things, to complain of the value that somebody may set on
their property." Id. at 455, 590 P.2d at 740-41 (quoting trial court); see People v.
McClean, 130 Cal. App. 2d 439, 440-41, 279 P.2d 87, 88-89 (1955) (when imposing
restitution as condition of probation, court stated that defendant would be sent to the
penitentiary if restitution was not made).
308. Whether the defendant has the right to cross-examine witnesses is not ad-
dressed in the Act or its legislative history. The Department of Justice suggests that
witnesses should not be present. Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 22; see
United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516, 535 (N.D. Ala.), appeal docketed, No.
83-7-444 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 1983), petition for writ of mandamus filed sub nom. In re
United States, No. 83-7-583 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 1983) (cross-examination not contem-
plated by statute).
309. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
310. See United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516, 534-35 (N.D. Ala.), appeal
docketed, No. 83-7-444 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 1983), petition for writ of mandamus filed
sub nora. In re United States, No. 83-7-583 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 1983); Altimari, supra
note 20, at 19. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
311. United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 398-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd,
603 F.2d 1053 (2d. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980); see United States
ex rel. Brown v. Rundle, 417 F.2d 282, 285 (3d Cir. 1969); Harkness, supra note 218,
at 1089; Disclosure of Reports, supra note 230, at 116-17.
312. See Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 4 of 5 (statement of Chief Judge
Wm. T. Hodges, M.D. Fla.) (court should hold pre-evidentiary hearing or pre-trial
conference). Several state restitution statutes specifically provide for a presentence
hearing to resolve issues relating to restitution. E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 1005-5-
6(a) (Smith-Hurd 1982) (hearing as a matter of right); Md. Ann. Code art. 27,
§ 641(a) (Supp. 1983) (same); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:43-3(e) (West 1982) (hearing if
trial record is unclear on amount of damages); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-08(1)
(1976) (hearing as a matter of right); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.20.030 (Supp.
1983-1984) (hearing if the trial record is unclear on the amount of damages); see
Harland I, supra note 30, at 107; see also N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 400.10 (McKinney
1983) (court has discretion to hold presentence conference); House Report, supra note
46, at 445 (Criminal Code Revision Act of 1980 would have required "the sentencing
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discuss issues relating to restitution without the pressures or anxieties
present at a sentencing hearing. 313 At the conference, the probation
officer, prosecutor, defendant, defense counsel, and judge should dis-
cuss the amount of loss claimed by the victim, 314 a schedule of pay-
ment315 and the defendant's financial resources. 31 68 In addition, the
government and defendant's counsel should make available any infor-
mation to be presented at the sentencing hearing. 317 The prosecutor
and defense attorney also should be given the power to stipulate that
the judge will not consider disputed information when imposing resti-
tution. 318 Finally, the defendant should be permitted to present a
restitution plan at the conference. 31 9 This plan would be developed
with a probation officer. 32 0
The presentence conference will give the judge time to reflect upon
the defendant's obligations and analyze whether restitution is appro-
priate in view of the defendant's financial resources and the other
judge, at least 5 days after disclosure of the presentence report to the defendant, to
conduct a hearing to determine any unresolved issue of fact that is essential to the
sentencing decision."); ABA Standards, supra note 210, Standard 18-5.5(c) commen-
tary at 18.382 (recommending use of presentence conference prior to all sentencing
hearings); Fennell & Hall, supra note 218, at 1679 (recommending use of presentence
conferences whenever possible).
313. See Harland I, supra note 30, at 105-06.
314. See N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-08(1)(a) (1976) (reasonableness of victim's
damages must be discussed at conference); Harland I, supra note 30, at 107 (victim's
losses should be discussed).
315. Harland I, supra note 30, at 107; see Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 1005-5-6(b)
(Smith-Hurd 1982); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 641(a) (Supp. 1983).
316. Harland I, supra note 30, at 107; see Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 1005-5-6(a)
(Smith-Hurd 1982); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-08(1)(b) (1976).
317. See Order to Facilitate Implementation of VWPA at 2 (N.D. Ga. June 27,
1983) (Moye, C.J.) ("The parties shall make available any documents or written
statements on which they intend to rely in a restitution proceeding."); Order to
Facilitate Implementation of VWPA at 2 (N.D. Ga. June 17, 1983) (O'Kelley, J.)
(same); ABA Sentencing Standards, supra note 210, Standard 18-5.5 commentary at
18.379-.380 ("prior mutual exchange of sentencing information is desirable"); Alti-
mari, supra note 20, at 20 ("court might consider ... ordering full disclosure of all
relevant financial and medical reports").
318. .See ABA Standards, supra note 210, Standard 18-5.5(b) commentary at
18.380; Fennell & Hall, supra note 218, at 1678. This will reduce the need to
introduce formal evidence at the sentencing hearing. See ABA Standards, supra note
210, Standard 18-5.5(b) commentary at 18.380.
319. See State v. Garner, 115 Ariz. 579, 581-82, 566 P.2d 1055, 1057-58 (1977);
People v. Gallagher, 55 Mich. App. 613, 620, 223 N.W.2d 92, 96 (1974); State v.
Lack, 98 N.M. 500, 506, 650 P.2d 22, 28-29 (1982); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-14-7 (1982);
Iowa Code Ann. § 907.12.3 (West 1979); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-17-1(B) (1978); S.D.
Codified Laws Ann. § 23A-28-4 (1979); Va. Code § 19.2-305, 19.2-305.1(B) (Supp.
1982); Harland I, supra note 30, at 106.
320. Harland I, supra note 30, at 107.
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goals of sentencing. 32' The judge will also have an opportunity to
question the parties in order to clarify the issues concerning restitution
without the time constraints present at sentencing. 322 In most cases,
disputes concerning restitution could be resolved at this informal con-
ference . 32 3
After the conference the court should schedule a sentencing hear-
ing. In the event a dispute still exists concerning the victim's claim, the
defendant would have the right to present evidence at the hearing3 24
and to call and cross-examine witnesses.3 2 5 Rules of evidence are un-
necessary, 32 6 provided the defendant has the opportunity to challenge
321. See ABA Standards, supra note 210, Standard 18-5.5 commentary at 18.384-
.385.
322. See id. at 18.385 (hearing will allow for meaningful dialogue between de-
fendant and court).
323. Although the ABA standards provide for an evidentiary sentencing hearing,
ABA Standards, supra note 210, Standard 18-6.4, the ABA states that such a hearing
should be the exception, and used only when the "need for further evidence has been
eliminated by the presentence conference." Id. Standard 18-6.4 commentary at
18.448.
324. United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775, 779-80 & n.15 (2d Cir. 1976); Model
Sentencing Act art. III, § 10 (rev. ed. 1972), in Compendium of Model Correctional
Legislation and Standards, at 11-57 (2d ed. 1975); ABA Standards, supra note 210,
Standard 18-6.4, at 18.460; National Advisory Commission on Criminal Standards
and Goals Standard 5.17(1)(b) (1973), reprinted in Compendium of Model Correc-
tional Legislation and Standards at VIII-74 (2d ed. 1975); Fennell & Hall, supra note
218, at 1678-79; see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(3)(c) (Supp. 1983); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 973.09(lm)(b) (West Supp. 1983-1984).
325. See People v. Tidwell, 33 Ill. App. 3d 232, 237, 338 N.E.2d 113, 117 (1975);
People v. Schleyhahn, 4 Ill. App. 3d 591, 596, 281 N.E.2d 409, 413 (1972); State v.
Harris, 70 N.J. 586, 598, 362 A.2d 32, 38 (1976); State v. Lack, 98 N.M. 500, 508,
650 P.2d 22, 30 (1982); Model Sentencing and Corrections Act § 3-206(b) (1979);
ABA Standards, supra note 210, Standard 18-6.4(b); National Advisory Commission
on Criminal Standards and Goals standard 5.17(1)(c), (d) (1973), reprinted in Com-
pendium of Model Correctional Legislation and Standards at VIII-74 (2d ed. 1975);
Harkness, supra note 218, at 1089; Disclosure of Reports, supra note 230, at 117. In
some circuits, the cross-examination of probation officers and others who supply
information for the report is routine. ABA Standards, supra note 210, Standard 18-
6.4 commentary at 18.455; e.g., United States ex rel. Brown v. Rundle, 417 F.2d
282, 285 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 398 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), afJ'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980); cf.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973) (right to cross-examine before proba-
tion revoked); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1971) (right to cross-examine
before parole revoked). The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983 contains a
provision that would allow the court to employ any additional procedures that are
necessary to implement restitution, which can include "hearing the testimony of
witnesses." 1983 Senate Report, supra note 133, at 81, 472.
326. Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3); see Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584
(1959); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1949); United States v. Fatico,
579 F.2d 707, 713 (2d Cir.), on remand, 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd,
603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980); Order to Facilitate
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any disputed evidence through cross-examination of witnesses. Evi-
dentiary rules may exclude information that the judge needs to tailor
the sentence to meet the needs of the defendant, the victim and
society. 32 7 Further, in civil actions, the protection provided by the
rules of evidence is most needed when the action is before a jury. -32 8 At
a sentencing hearing, the judge will be sitting without a jury32 9 and
should be able to discount unreliable information without specifically
applying evidentiary rules.330
4. Statement of the Reasons for Ordering Restitution
The Act requires a judge to state his reasons for not ordering restitu-
tion, 331 but the reasons for granting restitution are as important as the
reasons for denying it. A statement of the reasons for awarding restitu-
tion assists an appellate court in reviewing whether the trial court
abused its discretion when it ordered restitution. 332 Without such a
Implementation of VWPA at 2 (N.D. Ga. June 27, 1983) (Moye, C.J.) (Federal Rules
of Evidence do not apply in restitution proceedings); Order to Facilitate Implemen-
tation of VWPA at 2 (N.D. Ga. June 17, 1983) (O'Kelley, J.) (same); Model Sentenc-
ing and Corrections Act § 3-605 comment at 213; ABA Standards, supra note 210,
Standard 18-6.4; A. Campbell, supra note 208, § 85, at 275. Contra Bennett, supra
note 20, at 4-5 (Federal Rules of Evidence should apply to a contested restitution
hearing); Altimari, supra note 20, at 20 (same); see Model Sentencing Act article III,
§ 10 (1972 revision), reprinted in Compendium of Model Correctional Legislation
and Standards at 11-57 (2d ed. 1975) (hearsay evidence not admissible). Judges,
however, may want to apply evidentiary rules regarding relevancy and qualifications
of witnesses, such as Rule 104 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
327. In order to choose the most appropriate sentence, probation or imprison-
ment, the judge should consider information concerning the defendant's lifestyle and
character that would be inadmissable at trial, for example evidence excluded pursu-
ant to Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See supra note 220 and accompany-
ing text. This information may also influence the judge's decision concerning restitu-
tion. The judge may need to weigh the victim's need for compensation against
society's desire to imprison the defendant. A decision to imprison the defendant may
preclude the judge from ordering restitution. See infra notes 381-88 and accompany-
ing text.
328. G. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence § 3, at 3 n.4 (1978);
McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 60 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as McCormick]; see City of Indianapolis v. Parker, 427 N.E.2d
456, 463 (Ind. App. 1981); Bauer v. Graner, 266 N.W.2d 88, 94 (N.D. 1978): J.
Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 508 (1898).
329. See supra notes 186-215 and accompanying text.
330. McCormick, supra note 328, § 60; see Clark v. United States, 61 F.2d 695,
708 (8th Cir. 1932), affrd, 289 U.S. 1 (1933); State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581, 583,
618 P.2d 759, 761 (1980). Allowing the defendant to cross-examine witnesses will
give him an adequate opportunity to probe the reliability of the evidence contained
in the report. State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581, 584, 618 P.2d 759, 762 (1980).
331. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(2) (1982).
332. Harland I, supra note 30, at 101-02; see 1983 Senate Report, supra note 133,
at 80.
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statement it is impossible for an appellate court to know what infor-
mation the trial judge relied on in reaching his decision.3 33 Addition-
ally, requiring the judge to state his reasons encourages him to care-
fully consider the type and amount of restitution.3 34 Finally, a
statement of the reasons for ordering restitution helps the defendant to
understand the purpose behind the order, thus enhancing its rehabili-
tative effect.3 35 The Act therefore should be amended to require the
court to state its reasons for ordering restitution. 336
The VWPA makes victim compensation a goal of criminal restitu-
tion; however, this laudable goal must be achieved within the con-
fines of the Constitution. In order to provide victims with compensa-
tion without infringing on the defendant's constitutional rights, the
sentencing process must be complicated to some extent. The proce-
dures suggested in this section will assure that the defendant receives
adequate protection before the court orders restitution without trans-
forming the sentencing hearing into a full-blown trial.
333. Several circuit courts have stated that they strongly encourage trial judges to
state their reasons for a sentence because this helps to assure that the defendant is not
sentenced on the basis of erroneous information. See, e.g., United States v. Velaz-
quez, 482 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Brown, 479 F.2d 1170, 1172
(2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Deere, 428 F.2d 1119, 1122 (2d Cir. 1970); Scott v.
United States, 419 F.2d 264, 266-67 (D.C. Cir. 1969). But cf. United States v.
Thompson, 541 F.2d 794, 795 (9th Cir. 1976) (court need not state reasons for
imposing sentence).
334. See United States v. Velazquez, 482 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Brown, 479 F.2d 1170, 1172 (2d Cir. 1973); see also ABA Standards, supra
note 210, Standard 18-6.6 commentary at 18.486 ("[T]he disciplining effect of such
an obligation on the sentencing court's own thought processes can be significant. The
court is thereby induced to systematize and order its reasons, to avoid irrelevancies,
and to develop a more consistent sentencing philosophy.") (footnote omitted).
335. See Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 544-45, 336 A.2d 113, 118 (1975).
336. Several states have required the judge to state his reasons for ordering restitu-
tion. Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 756, 272 S.E.2d 709, 710 (1980); State v. Harris,
70 N.J. 586, 599, 362 A.2d 32, 39 (1976); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32.02(5) (Supp.
1983); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(3) (Supp. 1983); cf. 1983 Senate Report, supra
note 133, at 472 (Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, S. 1762, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983), requires court to state reasons for ordering restitution). Several
sentencing proposals suggest that the court state its reasons for imposing a sentence.
ABA Standards, supra note 210, Standard 18-6.6; National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Standards and Goals Standard 5.19(3) (1973), reprinted in Compendium of
Model Correctional Legislation and Standards VIII-76 (2d ed. 1975) (judges should
state reasons for sentence); cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973) (written
statement by factfinders is required before probation can be revoked); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (before parole can be revoked, due process requires
a "written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking parole").
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D. Plea Bargaining
Approximately 90% of all criminal convictions are obtained
through guilty pleas.3 37 Because the entire criminal justice system has
come to rely upon a high rate of plea bargaining, 33 the impact of the
Act on the plea-bargaining process must be examined.
1. Advising Defendants of the Possibility
of Restitutionary Obligations Prior
to Accepting a Guilty Plea
The court has a duty to advise a defendant of the direct conse-
quences of a guilty plea,339 which now may include restitution.
3 40
Failure to advise a defendant of at least the possibility of restitution
may invite attacks on the sentence, as the defendant may argue that
his plea was not voluntary because he was unaware of its direct
consequences. 3 41 Moreover, greater disclosure than merely informing
337. D. Newman, Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without
Trial 3 (1966). Guilty pleas or pleas of nolo contendere account for "about eighty to
ninety percent of all federal convictions." 1 S. Schulhofer, Prosecutorial Discretion
and Federal Sentencing Reform 8-9 (1979).
338. D. Newman, supra note 337, at 4. Guilty pleas are cost efficient; they assure
conviction at a lower cost than does a trial. Id.
339. Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1365 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1005 (1973); Tindall v. United States, 469 F.2d 92, 92 (5th Cir.
1972) (per curiam); Wade v. Coiner, 468 F.2d 1059, 1060 (4th Cir. 1972); D.
Newman, supra note 337, at 32; see Bennett, supra note 20, at 6. A direct conse-
quence of a guilty plea "[is] a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the
range of defendant's punishment." State v. Cameron, 30 Wash. App. 229, 233, 633
P.2d 901, 904-05 (1981); accord Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1365-66.
340. Restitution should be considered a direct consequence of a guilty plea because
the VWPA requires the imposition of restitution in all cases, 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1)
(1982), unless the judge can state reasons for not so ordering, id. § 3579(a) (2). A state
court has noted that when the imposition of restitution "stems directly from the
conviction of a crime that results in . . .loss to the victim," restitution is a "direct
consequence" of the guilty plea. State v. Cameron, 30 Wash. App. 229, 233-34, 633
P.2d 901, 905 (1981) (emphasis in original). The sentencing court may not impose
restitution upon a defendant who pleads guilty unless the defendant is informed of
the possibility of restitution as part of the sentence prior to entry of the plea. Id.; see
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 381, 401-02 (1983) (restitution is aspect of defend-
ant's sentence and therefore a matter about which defendant tendering guilty plea
should be advised) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Amendment]; Justice Dep't Guide-
lines, supra note 9, at 12.
341. See Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 1 of 5 (statement of Judge G.
Tjoflat, l1th Cir.). The need to inform defendants of the possibility of restitution has
been recognized. The Justice Department has stated that "[a]t proceedings pursuant
to Rule 11, Fed. R. Crim. P., the court [should] incorporate in its description of the
maximum sentence. . . the fact that the defendant may be sentenced to pay restitu-
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the defendant of the possibility of restitution may be required to
discharge the court's duty. Advising the defendant of the possibility of
restitution but not the limits or range of such restitution results in the
defendant not being aware of the actual maximum penalty at the time
he offers his plea.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the
court to inform the defendant of the maximum and minimum penal-
ties provided by law. 342 The Rule is designed to ensure that the de-
fendant's plea is made voluntarily and intelligently. 343 A proposed
amendment to Rule 11 is presently being considered that would re-
quire a defendant to be advised of the possibility of restitution before
the plea is accepted.3 44 The proposed amendment requires advice only
of the possibility of restitution "[b]ecause [the VWPA] contemplates
that the amount of the restitution. . . will be ascertained later in the
sentencing process .... The exact amount or upper limit cannot and
need not be stated at the time of the plea. ' 345 The amendment may
have the effect of discouraging guilty pleas because a defendant may
fear a limitless restitution order.3 46 This effect must be avoided be-
cause pleas promote efficiency within the criminal justice system.3 47
A slightly more restrictive alternative was suggested by the Supreme
Court of North Dakota. 348 The court reviewed a guilty plea that the
trial court accepted without specifying the amount of restitution that
could be ordered and stated that "[w]hen a defendant agrees to pay
for the damage. . . and has a general idea of the amount. . . which is
to be determined later, he cannot . . . claim . . . that he was not
made aware of the amount. ' 349 To effectuate this alternative, a report
tion." Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 12. The Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States has presented
an amendment to Rule 11 which would make advising the defendant of the possibil-
ity of restitution a statutory requirement. Proposed Amendment, supra note 340, at
401-02. One federal district court judge suggests that the defendant be informed not
only of the possibility of restitution but also that a failure to comply with the
restitution order may result in a parole violation. Teleconference Tapes, supra note
1, side 3 of 5 (statement of Judge J. Miller, Jr., D. Md.).
342. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1).
343. See United States v. Journet, 544 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1976); Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11 advisory committee notes.
344. See supra note 341.
345. Proposed Amendment, supra note 340, at 402.
346. See United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516, 535 (N.D. Ala. 1983), appeal
docketed, No. 83-7-444 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 1983), petition for writ of mandamus filed
sub nom. In re United States, No. 83-7-583 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 1983).
347. D. Newman, supra note 337, at 4; see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
260 (1971).
348. State v. Thorstad, 261 N.W.2d 899 (N.D.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906
(1978).
349. Id. at 901.
1984] 565
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
could be prepared at the time the indictment is drafted that would
include a description of the loss sustained by the victim. Such a report
poses no practical difficulty. Victim identification must be made prior
to drafting the indictment because only those victims included in the
indictment will be eligible to receive restitution. 350 This report, if
made available to the defendant prior to the Rule 11 proceeding,
would provide him with a general idea of the dollar amount of the
harm, thus satisfying the North Dakota court's limited disclosure
requirement and reducing fears of limitless restitution orders.
The defendant must at least have the opportunity to examine the
report describing victim losses in order to weigh the advisibility of a
guilty plea. 35' These procedures will not discourage guilty pleas or
pleas of nolo contendere while giving the defendant a general idea of
the level of damage.
2. Restitution as an Element of Plea Bargaining
Whether to order restitution under the VWPA is a matter of judi-
cial discretion; 352 however, it is generally agreed that restitution may
be made part of a plea arrangement. 353 Allowing restitution to be
bargained with raises the potential that it may be used as leverage. 354
For example, a reduced charge may be exchanged for a defendant's
promise to make restitution. 355 The potential for a defendant to "buy
out" of all or part of a jail term raises the problem of disparate
treatment of defendants based on their inability to pay.35 6 The ceiling
350. Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 8.
351. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
352. See 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982).
353. See United States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052, 1054 (7th Cir. 1982) (restitution
may be negotiated under the Federal Probation Act); Phillips v. United States, 679
F.2d 192, 194 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp.
907, 912 (D. Md. 1981) (same). At least one state court has also recognized restitution
as a "bargaining chip." State v. McIntyre, 33 N.C. App. 557, 561, 235 S.E.2d 920,
923 (1977). But see People v. Anonymous, 56 Misc. 2d 792, 795, 290 N.Y.S.2d 507,
511 (Nassau County Ct. 1968) (restitution to be made subject to and under judicial
control, not as part of plea-bargaining arrangement to avoid prosecution).
The Justice Department takes the position that plea bargaining "offers the govern-
ment attorney the opportunity to fashion the maximum [restitutionary] relief for
victims." Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 25; see Bennett, supra note 20, at
6 (although imposition of restitution is a matter of judicial discretion, it is a "legiti-
mate subject matter of plea bargaining").
354. Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 4 of 5 (question and answer session).
355. D. Newman, supra note 337, at 129.
356. This potential for disparate treatment is the same as that posed by ordering
service restitution in lieu of unavailable financial restitution. See supra notes 87, 90
and accompanying text. The constitutional implications are more serious in the area
of plea bargains because incarceration is involved instead of the mere substitution of
service for financial restitution. Maine has recogni7ed this problem and has stated
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of punishment for indigents thus would be greater than the punish-
ment for defendants with means. The VWPA should be amended to
include a statement of policy that restitution should not be used as
leverage in the bargaining process. 35
III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPENSATION
Unless the Act is effective in delivering restitution, the "ultimate
justice," the VWPA will merely be a procedural skeleton to convey an
empty congressional promise. Congress expanded the applicability of
restitution beyond that of the Probation Act in an attempt to meet
more effectively the compensation needs of crime victims. 35 8 Yet, the
legislative history of the VWPA indicates that Congress was aware
that restitution would be an ineffective means to accomplish this
goal. 359 Compensating crime victims through sentencing may be ap-
pealing in the abstract but is often disappointing in reality because
victims frequently do not receive adequate compensation. 360
A victim must overcome a number of obstacles before he can receive
restitution through sentencing. 36' One of the major obstacles that a
that restitution should not "result in preferential treatment for offenders with sub-
stantial financial resources." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1321 (1983).
357. Although restitution should remain an element of plea bargaining to serve
the compensatory goals of the Act, see supra note 40 and accompanying text, Con-
gress must develop a scheme to prevent affluent defendants from benefiting from the
ability to make restitution in relation to the level of punishment they receive. Cf. Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1321 (1983).
358. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 30-31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 2536-37; 128 Cong. Rec. S3860-61 (daily ed. April 22, 1982) (state-
ment of Sen. Chiles).
359. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 33, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2539; 128 Cong. Rec. H8202 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (statement of Rep.
Rodino) (recognizing that restitution is not likely to satisfy all victims); 128 Cong.
Rec. S3854-55 (daily ed. April 22, 1982) (statement of Sen. Heinz).
360. Galaway, Toward Rational Development of Restitution, in Restitution in
Criminal Justice 77, 82 (J. Hudson & B. Galaway eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Calaway I]; see Harland, Compensating the Victims of Crime, 14 Crim. L. Bull.
203, 215 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Harland III]; L.G. Shultz, The Violated: A
Proposal to Compensate Victims of Violent Crimes, 10 St. Louis U.L.J. 238, 243
(1965). Despite the ineffectivness of restitution as a means of compensating crime
victims, a large number of commentators support it for its rehabilitative effect. See
Calaway I, supra, at 83. A survey of nineteen restitution programs in the United
States and Canada revealed that victim compensation was the primary goal of only
four programs. J. Hudson, B. Galaway & S. Chesney, supra note 264, at 314.
361. See Harland III, supra note 360, at 215 ("The first factor confronting a crime
victim seeking restitution is that the criminal justice system works in many ways that
virtually assure that the offender will not pay restitution.") (emphasis in original).
362. See Harland III, supra note 360, at 221; Analytic Report, supra note 201, at
25.
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victim faces is finding a defendant. 3 2 A victim can only receive com-
pensation if the defendant is apprehended and convicted. 3 3 Studies
show that a majority of criminals are never caught. 36 4 This is espe-
cially true in cases of crimes against property. 365 Yet, ironically, resti-
tution is most frequently applied to these property crimes. 366 Even if
the offender is caught, plea bargaining severely reduces the probabil-
ity that a victim will receive compensation. 367 Due to the pervasive use
of plea bargaining, 368 most restitution orders compensate victims for
only a small portion of the total harm suffered. 36 9
Another obstacle a victim faces in obtaining compensation is find-
ing a defendant with the ability to make restitution.3 70 A 1978 na-
363. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 33, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 2539; 128 Cong. Rec. H8202 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (statement of
Rep. Rodino); Calaway, The Use of Restitution, 23 Crime & Delinq. 57, 64 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Galaway II]; Harland III, supra note 360, at 215; Analytic
Report, supra note 201, at 22.
364. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States Department of Justice, Source-
book of Criminal Justice Statistics-1982, at 294-303 (estimate of victimization not
reported to police) [hereinafter cited as Sourcebook]; Harland III, supra note 360, at
215 (a large portion of criminals are never caught). When the offender is caught, the
arrest often does not result in a conviction. E. Kittrie & N. Zenoff, supra note 208, at
189; Galaway II, supra note 363, at 64.
365. Analytic Report, supra note 201, at 23 (Uniform Crime Reports of 1974 show
property offenses have lowest clearing rate).
366. Harland III, supra note 360, at 216-17; Analytic Report, supra note 201, at
23; see Edelhertz, Legal and Operational Issues in the Implementation of Restitution
Within the Criminal Justice System, in Restitution in Criminal Justice 63, 69-70 (J.
Hudson & B. Galaway eds. 1975); Jacob II, supra note 215, at 155; Rehabilitation of
Victims, supra note 158, at 323.
367. Analytic Report, supra note 201, at 23; see Hudson, Galaway & Chesney,
supra note 264, at 318; Klein, supra note 235, at 402-03.
368. Approximately 90 % of all federal convictions result from guilty pleas. House
Report, supra note 46, at 444; cf. Report to the Nation, supra note 109, at 65
(examples of state rates of guilty pleas: Manhattan, N.Y.-63 %, Rhode Island-79 %).
369. This would occur under a definition of "offense" that limits recovery to
offenses for which a conviction was had. Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 1
of 5 (L. Schwartz, Benjamin Franklin Prof. of Law, Univ. of Pa.). See supra notes
26-27 and accompanying text. Often an offender will plead guilty to one count in
return for an agreement with the prosecutor to drop similar charges. Analytic Re-
port, supra note 201, at 23. Unless a defendant admits to his total financial liability,
he may not be required to compensate victims of the counts dropped. See Justice
Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 8.
370. Ability to pay restitution encompasses the defendant's financial resources and
his present earning ability. Materials to Accompany Teleconference, supra note 17,
at 29. A recent report on the effectiveness of restitution in the criminal system stated
that "[a] significant number of offenders . . . will be unsuitable for a straight cash
restitution disposition because they are unemployed, earn too little, or are juveniles."
Analytic Report, supra note 201, at 17; see L. G. Shultz, supra note 360, at 243
(restitution is ineffective in meeting "compensation needs of the great majority of
victims because probationers and parolees are either insolvent or, if employed, do not
earn enough to exceed basic needs"); Chesney, Hudson & McLagen, A New Look at
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tional survey of jail inmates in the United States reported that the
median income was $3,714. 371 This obviously affects the victim's abil-
ity to collect an award and may also affect both the court's willingness
to order restitution and the amount ordered. 372 Under the VWPA, the
court must consider the defendant's finances before ordering restitu-
tion37 3 and "[t]he economic status of the offender influences the rem-
edy imposed to a greater degree than does the harm he caused to his
victim. ,374
Victims of non-violent property crimes may have a better chance of
receiving compensation. 375 One study reported that the average loss
for crimes such as pocket-picking, purse-snatching, burglary, vehicle
theft, and unarmed robbery are well within the financial means of
most offenders. 370 In addition, these crimes rarely result in incarcera-
Restitution: Recent Legislation, Programs and Research, 61 Judicature 348, 357
(1978) (At Georgia's four restitution shelters only 26 % of total restitution obligations
for the year were repaid because of offender unemployment.). At the teleconference,
it was cautioned that victims may not receive restitution in light of the fact that most
defendants are poor. Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 4 of 5 (open discussion
among panelists). Professor Harland states, however, that the "question of the of-
fender's ability to pay may not be as problematic as most commentators have as-
sumed," Harland III, supra note 360, at 221, because of the "low loss figures
reported for the types of victimizations for which restitution is frequently used...
purse-snatching/pocket-picking, burglary, larceny, vehicle theft, and unarmed rob-
bery," id. at 220; see Senate Report, supra note 1, at 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 2536 (average dollar losses victims suffer total hundreds, not
thousands of dollars), and because restitution can be paid in installments. Harland
III, supra note 360, at 221; see 18 U.S.C. § 3579(f) (1982).
371. Sourcebook, supra note 364, at 522; see Analytic Report, supra note 201, at
19; Business Roundtable Discussion, supra note 146, at 2604.
372. See R. Dawson, Sentencing: The Decision as to the Type, Length, and
Conditions of Sentence 109 (F. Remington ed. 1969) (judges show unwillingness to
order restitution if offender is receiving public assistance); Chesney, Hudson &
McLagen, supra note 370, at 355 (common criteria for judges in ordering restitution
is offender's ability to make restitution).
373. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a) (1982). See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
374. Edelhertz, supra note 366, at 63. One public defender maintains that if the
defendant is shown by the preponderance of the evidence to be indigent, the Act
cannot be applied. Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 3 of 5 (statement of F.
Bennett, Federal Public Defender, D. Md.); see 1981 Senate Report, supra note 15,
at 999 (before ordering restitution court must "examine the overall financial implica-
tions to the defendant").
375. See Harland III, supra note 360, at 220-21.
376. Analytic Report, supra note 201, at 9 (Almost one-half of the six non-violent
offenses studied, larceny from the home, larceny away from the home, burglary,
purse-snatching/pocket-picking, vehicle theft and unarmed robbery, that result in
damages, "involved amounts of less than $25 in 1974."); see Hudson, Galaway &
Chesney, supra note 264, at 318 ("1974 Uniform Crime Report indicates that the
average dollar loss in a burglary was $391 . . .[and] the average value of property
stolen in a theft was $156."). But see Senate Hearings, supra note 194, at 68 (testi-
mony of crime victim Virginia Montgomery) (medical bills of $11,000 as result of
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tion. 377 These offenses are usually state crimes, however, and the
VWPA would be inapplicable. 378
The likelihood of victim compensation is drastically reduced, how-
ever, when a defendant is incarcerated.3 7 When restitution is ordered
in conjunction with imprisonment, a defendant does not have the
opportunity to work and save money. This is especially true when a
defendant is convicted of a violent crime which usually results a long
prison sentence. 380
Restitution and a term of imprisonment are irreconcilable 8' be-
cause prison wages are very low. 382 Thus, while the VWPA gives the
court authority to order restitution in conjunction with imprison-
ment, 38 3 this authority may be of little benefit to crime victims.384 The
incompatibility between restitution and imprisonment was reflected
in State v. Murray,385 in which the defendant was sentenced to a ten-
purse snatching). Property crimes have the lowest arrest rate, however, thus reducing
the likelihood of restitution. See supra note 364-66 and accompanying text.
377. See Harland III, supra note 360, at 216.
378. 128 Cong. Rec. S11,438 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1982) (statement of Sen. Dodd);
see Senate Report, supra note 1, at 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2516.
379. See Edelhertz, supra note 366, at 69; Harland III, supra note 360, at 216;
Jacob II, supra note 215, at 152. For example, an estimated 90 % of the inmates in
the United States penitentiary in Atlanta, the largest federal correctional facility, are
indigent. Id. at 152 n.3; see Rehabilitation of Victims, supra note 158, at 320.
380. See Analytic Report, supra note 201, at 23. Recent prison statistics show that
the prison population is increasing in every state, and that the length of time served
in prison is rising. Office of Justice Assistance, Research, and Statistics, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Justice Assistance News vol. 4, No. 7, at 5 (Sept. 1983).
381. Harland, One Hundred Years of Restitution: An International Review and
Prospectus for Research 10 (Jan. 3-9, 1982) (presented at the International Sympo-
sium on Victimology; to be published in Victimology) ("[A]lthough a growing num-
ber of statutes have recently authorized courts . . . to pursue restitution through
institutional correctional industries,... the reality in most instances continues to be
that such industries either do not exist or offenders are so poorly paid, if paid at all,
that restitution and imprisonment continue to be de facto incompatible sanctions.")
[hereinafter cited as Harland IV]; see Chesney, Hudson & McLagen, supra note 370,
at 354; Analytic Report, supra note 201, at 23.
382. Harland III, supra note 360, at 216; Jacob II, supra note 215, at 152, 160; see
Challenge of Crime, supra note 211, at 176 (federal prison wages averaged $40 per
month in 1965).
383. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982).
384. See Harland, The Views of Practitioners 145 (undated) (unpublished report
for the U.S. Dep't of Justice) (available in files of Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter
cited as Harland V]. In interviews with nine felony court judges, eight deputy district
attorneys and five probation officers from Oregon, id. at 122, "[a]ll respondents saw
little practical value in the ... law authorizing sentencing courts to impose restitu-
tion for offenders sentenced to prison," id. at 154. The general consensus among the
judges was "that ordering restitution coupled with a term in the penitentiary was
mostly a symbolic gesture, 'to get it on the record,' without much hope that it would
ever be paid or be very meaningful to the victim." Id. at 145.
385. 621 P.2d 334 (Hawaii 1980).
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year term of imprisonment and ordered to make restitution.3 8 6 Be-
cause of low prison wages, the appellate court rejected ordering resti-
tution to be paid from the prisoner's earnings. 38 7 The court noted the
conflict between restitution, which extracts money from a defendant,
and imprisonment, which restricts the defendant's ability to earn
money. 388
Another limitation on the victim's recovery is the subordination of
restitution to more traditional sentencing goals. 389 Some judges are
reluctant to order restitution because they fear it might pressure the
defendant into committing another crime in order to meet his restitu-
tion obligation.390 Such a result would conflict with the goal of reha-
bilitation. 39' Even in civil law jurisdictions such as Germany and
France, where the victim has the right to assert a civil claim along
with the criminal prosecution, courts invariably subrogate the goal of
victim compensation to the punitive and rehabilitative goals of sen-
tencing. 392
The victim's recovery is also reduced because under the Act the
victim can only recover those losses that are enumerated in the Act.393
Further, the Department of Justice takes the position that a sentencing
hearing cannot be delayed to enable a victim to gather information
regarding on-going medical expenses; 394 thus, the victim may never
386. Id. at 336.
387. Id. at 340.
388. Id. at 342.
389. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 31 (victim can receive compensation only
when sentencing is not unduly complicated), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 2537; Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 22-23 (cannot delay
sentencing to allow victim to gather information regarding on-going medical ex-
penses); Harland III, supra note 360, at 216 ("restitution must assume its place
among hierarchy of traditional sentencing goals of deterrence, deserts, rehabilita-
tion, and incapacitation"); see Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1321 (1983-1984)
(restitution should be ordered only when other purposes of sentencing can be appro-
priately served).
390. Edelhertz, supra note 366, at 64; Harland V, supra note 384, at 148. At the
Teleconference on the VWPA, one federal judge expressed his concern with ordering
restitution in conjunction with incarceration because of his experience with a defend-
ant who engineered a massive mail fraud scheme in order to pay a restitution order
and thereby avoid a revocation of probation proceeding. Teleconference Tapes,
supra note 1, side 4 of 5 (statement of Chief Judge Wm. T. Hodges, M.D. Fla.).
Contra Chesney, Hudson & McLagen, supra note 370, at 356 (judges generally
support restitution as rehabilitative).
391. Restitution may conflict with the punitive goal of sentencing, if the defend-
ant must be sentenced to a prison term for the protection of society. Because of this
conflict, restitution is used primarily as an alternative sentence. Analytic Report,
supra note 201, at 23; Harland III, supra note 360, at 216.
392. Harland IV, supra note 381, at 12-13.
393. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
394. Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 22-23.
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have the opportunity to prove even the limited losses provided for in
the Act.
Finally, a victim can only receive restitution if courts and probation
departments actively monitor restitution payments. In the past,
judges have stated that the enforcement of restitution orders reduces
the court to a debt collection agency. 395 Probation officers have also
stated that "effective probation supervision is impossible when they
must perform extensive collection agency functions. '36 Although the
VWPA gives the victim the right to bring a civil action to enforce a
restitution order,397 this will only help those victims with the time and
financial resources to bring such an action. The Justice Department
has indicated that the victim cannot look to the government for
assistance in this respect. 398 Rather than outlining specific procedures
for the courts and probation departments to follow, the Act places the
burden of collection on the victim. Such a burden does little to ad-
vance the congressional goal of assisting crime victims. 399
As a result of these problems, Congress is promising victims greater
compensation than the system can deliver. 40 1 In fact, the restitution
395. See People v. Moore, 43 Mich. App. 693, 697, 204 N.W.2d 737, 739 (1972);
People v. Grago, 24 Misc. 2d 739, 742, 204 N.Y.S.2d 774, 778 (Oneida County Ct.
1960); State v. Barnett, 110 Vt. 221, 236, 3 A.2d 521, 527 (1939) (Sherburne, J.,
dissenting); see also State v. Scherr, 9 Wis.2d 418, 424, 101 N.W.2d 77, 80 (1960)
("Neither should the criminal process be used to supplement a civil suit or as a threat
to coerce the payment of civil liability and thus reduce the criminal court to a
collection agency.").
396. R. Dawson, supra note 372, at 105 & n.15; see Chesney, Hudson & McLa-
gen, supra note 370, at 354; Calaway II, supra note 363, at 66; Harland III, supra
note 360, at 218. In the legislative history of the VWPA, Congress recognized that
restitution orders have been indifferently enforced. Senate Report, supra note 1, at
30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2536.
397. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h) (1982); see Senate Report, supra note 1, at 33, reprinted
in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2539.
398. Justice Dep't Guidelines, supra note 9, at 9 ("The Department's position is
that assistance from the government should be granted on a case-by-case basis in
compelling circumstances.").
399. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 2536; 128 Cong. Rec. H8201 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (statement of
Rep. Rodino); 128 Cong. Rec. S3861 (daily ed. April 22, 1982) (statement of Sen.
Chiles).
400. Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 4 of 5 (statement of Chief Judge
Wm. T. Hodges, M.D. Fla.). The Senate version of the VWPA contained a provision
that would have required the Attorney General "within six months of the title's
enactment . . . [to] report to Congress whether additional laws are necessary to
ensure ... all crime victims [receive] just compensation." Senate Report, supra note
1, at 33, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2539. Commentators
generally agree that victim compensation programs meet the needs of crime victims
more effectively than criminal restitution. See Edelhertz, supra note 366, at 63;
Galaway I, supra note 360, at 82; Geis, supra note 264, at 151; Jacob II, supra note
215, at 152. Compensation funds are usually operated by the state, see Harland I,
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provison may be counterproductive. 40 1 In theory restitution may be
available to all victims, but Congress can not alter the fact that many
offenders are never caught. Even when an offender is caught, he is
likely to be indigent and thus unable to deliver compensation. Restitu-
tion, therefore, may be an illusion. When a victim realizes that com-
pensation is not forthcoming, he may feel frustrated and victimized by
the system designed for his benefit.
CONCLUSION
Congress has opened a Pandora's box by enacting the VWPA with-
out adequately addressing the difficulties of incorporating restitution
into the criminal justice system. The problems discussed in this Project
prevent the VWPA from providing a viable framework for courts to
use at sentencing. Unless these problems are resolved, the VWPA and
criminal restitution in general cannot compensate victims without
infringing upon defendants' constitutional rights. The legislative re-
sponse to these problems will indicate whether Congress is earnestly
trying to meet the needs of crime victims or is merely attempting "to
placate a growing number of electorates" 402 who have become con-
cerned with the plight of victims. 40 3
Lorraine Slavin
David J. Sorin
supra note 30, at 59, and a victim can receive compensation regardless of whether the
defendant is apprehended, Analytic Report, supra note 201, at 2. Legislation to
create a federal victim compensation fund has been introduced in Congress every
year since 1965. Harland I, supra note 30, at 59. On March 7, 1983, Senator Heinz
again introduced such a bill. S. 704, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. S2293-94
(daily ed. March 8, 1983). President Reagan also has endorsed a compensation fund
plan. Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1984, at 3, col. 4. The creation of a Crime Victim's
Assistance Fund has been proposed. See Hearings Concerning H.R. 3498-Victim
Compensation Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1984) (statement of Lois Haight Herrington, Ass't
Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
401. Teleconference Tapes, supra note 1, side 4 of 5 (open discussion among
panelists).
402. Harland III, supra note 360, at 224.
403. 128 Cong. Rec. S11,435 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1982) (statement of Sen.
Mathias) ("[T]here is increased public awareness of the need to sensitize the criminal
justice system to the problems faced by victims of crime.").
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